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ABSTRACT
Two Essays in Corporate Finance. (May 2011)
Kershen Huang, B.A., National Chung Cheng University;
M.S., Texas A&M University;
M.S., Texas A&M University
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Shane A. Johnson
Dr. Sudheer Chava
In the first essay, “Why Won’t You Forgive Me? Evidence of a Financial Misre-
porting Stigma in Bank Loan Pricing,” we examine the relation between bank loan
pricing and intentional financial misreporting. Firms that misreport financial infor-
mation pay greater spreads on their bank loans for five years following their restate-
ments, whether benchmarked against their pre-restatement loans or similar loans
made to matched non-misreporting firms. Misreporting firms that promptly replace
certain parties who are potentially related to the misreporting see their spreads fall
to benchmark levels within three years following restatement. Large fractions of
firms, however, do not promptly replace the potentially related parties and continue
to pay premiums over benchmark spread levels for five years following restatement.
The results suggest that misreporting creates a long-lasting and costly stigma, but
that certain actions can reduce the duration of the stigma.
In the second essay, “Can Shareholder-Creditor Conflicts Explain Weak Gover-
nance? Evidence from the Value of Cash Holdings,” we look into whether shareholder-
creditor conflicts generate costs large enough to prevent improvements in governance.
If firms choose to remain weakly governed, some cost must prevent improvements.
We address our research question by estimating the value of cash as a function of
governance, leverage, and the interaction of the two. We find that governance in-
creases the value of cash, but that leverage reduces the gain from strong governance.
iv
However, the magnitudes are far too small to explain why weak governance firms
remain weakly governed. Our estimates suggest more than 80% of weakly governed
firms would increase the value of their cash by improving governance. In fact, half
of weakly governed firms would increase the value of their cash holdings by $0.35
or more per dollar held by improving governance. Our focus on cash holdings does
not seem to drive our results, nor do endogenous governance choices or nonlinearities
reverse our conclusions.
vTo Peiling
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11. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation contains two essays, as presented in Sections 2 and 3, which are
parts of larger research efforts of Chava, Huang, and Johnson (2011) and Galpin and
Huang (2011), repectively.
In the first essay, “Why Won’t You Forgive Me? Evidence of a Financial Misre-
porting Stigma in Bank Loan Pricing,”1 we study the stigma of the adverse effect
of intentional financial misreporting on bank loan pricing and the mitigation of such
effect associated with significant firm actions.
Firms that misreport financial information pay greater spreads on their bank
loans for five years following their restatements, whether benchmarked against their
pre-restatement loans or similar loans made to matched non-misreporting firms. Mis-
reporting firms that promptly replace certain parties who are potentially related to
the misreporting see their spreads fall to benchmark levels within three years fol-
lowing restatement. Large fractions of firms, however, do not promptly replace the
potentially related parties and continue to pay premiums over benchmark spread lev-
els for five years following restatement. The results suggest that misreporting creates
a long-lasting and costly stigma, but that certain actions can reduce the duration of
the stigma.
To the extent that banks should be able to revise estimates of value and cash flows
relatively quickly, and thus quickly adjust loan spreads to the levels predicted by the
restated financial figures, the long-lasting stigma evident in post-restatement loan
spreads likely reflects higher information costs and uncertainty that banks face in
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Finance.
1We are grateful to seminar participants at Bentley University, Indiana University at South Bend,
International University of Japan, Texas A&M University, and University of Kentucky for helpful
comments. We thank Emmanuel Alanis for excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors or
omissions are the authors’ alone.
2making loans to firms that misreported long ago. Regaining credibility in reporting
financial information appears to take a long time in the private loan market, but
prompt replacements of certain parties appear to mitigate the duration of the stigma
effect on a firm’s cost of private debt capital. Overall, our results have implications
for understanding the effects of misreporting on firm value and on the importance
that banks place on the accuracy of reported financial information, despite that they
may also use soft information in their credit screening and monitoring.
In the second essay, “Can Shareholder-creditor Conflicts Explain Weak Gover-
nance? Evidence from the Value of Cash Holdings,”2 we ask whether shareholder-
creditor conflicts generate costs that are large enough to prevent improvements in
governance.
If firms choose to remain weakly governed, some cost must prevent improvements.
Given that the conflict between shareholders and creditors is a widely proposed
factor, we ask whether it is indeed enough to explain why weakly governed firms
maintain weak governance. To do so, we estimate the value of cash as a function
of governance, leverage, and the interaction of the two. We find that governance
increases the value of cash, but that leverage reduces the gain from strong governance.
However, the magnitudes are far too small to explain why weak governance firms
remain weakly governed. Our estimates suggest more than 80% of weakly governed
firms would increase the value of their cash by improving governance. In fact, half
of weakly governed firms would increase the value of their cash holdings by $0.35 or
more per dollar held by improving governance.
2Previous versions were circulated under the title “Creditor and Shareholder Conflicts: Evidence
from the Value of Cash Holdings.” We thank Sudheer Chava, Mike Gallmeyer, Shane Johnson,
Scott Lee, Dave Mauer, Bill Maxwell, David Smith, Johan Sulaeman (discussant), Bill Willhelm
and participants at the Florida State University, University of Melbourne, University of Virginia,
and the 2009 Lone Star Symposium in Lubbock, TX for helpful comments. Any remaining errors
or omissions are the authors’ alone.
3In sum, we show that the magnitudes of costs from shareholder-creditor conflicts
do not appear large enough for shareholders to actually prefer weak governance to
strong. In fact, the magnitudes of shareholder-creditor conflicts are too small to even
make most shareholders reasonably indifferent between weak and strong governance.
If shareholders find weak governance better than strong governance-and we know
they must, since we observe weak governance-costs other than shareholder-creditor
conflicts must prevent strengthening governance.
42. WHY WON’T YOU FORGIVE ME?
Revealing that financial statements were deliberately misreported conveys two
things about the misreporting firm, both of which should have adverse consequences
for firms’ bank loan contracting terms. First, because most restatements by borrow-
ers cause reported earnings to be revised downward, restatements should generally
cause lenders to revise downward their estimates of future cash flows and firm value.3
Ceteris paribus, these revisions should cause adverse changes to bank loan contract
terms. Second, lenders learn that some factors inside the firm must have contributed
to the misreporting. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006), and
Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) find that misreporting firms have greater stock and
option-related managerial incentives to misreport. Other potential factors include
weak internal controls or weak governance Farber (2005) and individual attributes
or a company culture that encourages misreporting. If lenders are not credibly con-
vinced that the factors that contributed to the misreporting have changed, they may
question the credibility of future information provided by the firm, and more gener-
ally, question the veracity of the firm. The increased uncertainty about the reliability
3Most of the restatements in our sample are due to revenue/expense recognition. While there may
be cases where cash flow items are misclassified, total net cash flows shouldn’t change. One may
raise the concern as to how an accrual event, such as most restatements, can have a cash flow
effect. It is worth noting that here we are referring to expected future cash flows, from which debt
payments will be serviced. The link between current earnings and future cash flows is suggested
by the FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (No. 1, item 43), which clearly states
that earnings information is helpful in the assessments of the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of
future cash flows. Empirically, current earnings have been shown to be value-relevant and serve as
a predictor for future cash flows (Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998; Finger, 1994).
The cash flow predictability of earnings is also evident to be increasing over time (Kim and Kross,
2005). From our results in this paper, we indirectly provide support to the notion that financial
statements are an important source of information about borrowers for banks. At the time of debt
contracting, banks are pricing loans according to not only loan level characteristics, but also firm
level fundamentals. They use information provided in financial statements to assess the risk and
credit quality of the borrowing firms. As such, the quality of accounting information would affect
the lenders’ estimates of borrowers’ future cash flows (Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder, 2008).
5of information and veracity of the firm should increase screening and monitoring costs
for banks, and may also reduce the effectiveness of covenants written on reported
information. The increased costs and the reduced effectiveness of covenants should
adversely affect loan contract terms.
Consistent with the hypothesis that misreporting should adversely affect firms’
bank loan contracting terms, Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) find that firms pay a misre-
porting premium in the form of significantly higher loan spreads for post-restatement
loans. Loans to misreporting firms also have shorter maturities, a greater likelihood
of being secured, and more restrictive covenants. We replicate Graham, Li, and
Qiu’s (2008) findings that misreporting firms pay significantly higher loan spreads
in an expanded sample of restatements from 1997 to 2006. As in Graham, Li, and
Qiu (2008), we also find that the effects of restatements on loan spreads are larger
in cases that appear to have been deliberate misreporting (i.e., irregularities) as op-
posed to ones that stem from errors (Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008). The effects
are large economically and suggest that banks view restatements by their borrowers
as important events.
Given the misreporting premium evident in bank loan spreads, we test two hy-
potheses to attempt to shed additional light on the effects of misreporting on a
borrower’s contracting in debt markets. We first test the hypothesis that there is
a long-lasting and costly misreporting stigma evidenced by higher loan spreads for
misreporting firms. Once financial figures are restated, a bank should be able to re-
vise estimates of value and cash flows relatively quickly, and thus quickly adjust loan
spreads to levels appropriate for the true (restated) financial figures. If the effect
of misreporting on loan spreads is limited to these short-term revisions, we should
observe that misreporting firms pay spreads consistent with their restated financial
figures soon after their restatements. In contrast, it may be difficult for a firm to
credibly convince banks that it has eliminated the factors inside the firm that con-
tributed to the misreporting. If so, firms could have a potentially long-lasting stigma
6that causes banks to question the veracity of the firm, and thus charge them greater
loan spreads to cover the increased screening and monitoring costs. Given the nature
of the research question, we focus our analysis on the subsample of cases in which
misreporting was apparently deliberate (i.e., the irregularities in Hennes, Leone, and
Miller, 2008).4
It is not obvious that firms should face a long-lasting misreporting stigma in bank
loan markets. Many studies in the banking firm literature focus on the informational
advantages banks have through their ability to observe debits and credits to bor-
rowers’ checking accounts. Norden and Weber (2010) provide an excellent review of
this literature and new empirical results consistent with the usefulness of information
derived from borrowers’ checking accounts. If banks can observe sufficient informa-
tion from the cash inflows and outflows from their borrowers’ checking accounts at
low cost, the credibility of a borrowing firm’s financial statements and its veracity
may matter less to banks than to other outside capital providers. Whether the in-
formation gleaned from borrowers’ checking accounts can substitute for information
reported by firms is an empirical question. Testing the hypothesis of a long-lasting
misreporting stigma provides indirect evidence on this question.
We find strong support for the hypothesis that misreporting creates a long-lasting
and costly stigma. Among misreporting firms, post-restatement loan spreads are
significantly greater than pre-restatement spreads for at least five years following re-
statement. A misreporting premium in post-restatement loan spreads is also evident
when we use a nearest neighbor matching estimator approach to compare misre-
porting firms’ loans to similar loans obtained by non-misreporting firms with similar
4Consistent with Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), the restatements in our sample are mostly due
to revenue recognition (47.13%), cost of sales or operating expense (26.44%), and restructuring
(assets/inventory, 16.09%). Comparing our sample to that in their paper, we see larger percentages
of restatements relating to revenue recognition and cost or expenses. This is not surprising, given
that we focus on irregularities (Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008).
7characteristics. The misreporting premium exhibits a decline over time, but five years
following a restatement misreporting firms still pay a loan spread that is 34% higher
than comparable non-misreporting firms pay on comparable loans. The long-lasting
misreporting premium is consistent with the view that banks face greater informa-
tion costs and uncertainty when making loans to firms that have misreported even
five years before the current pricing of a loan.
We next test the hypothesis that firms can avoid or reduce the misreporting
stigma by promptly replacing certain parties who are potentially related to the mis-
reporting. Prompt replacement of potentially related parties – CEOs, CFOs, audit
committee chairs, and external auditors – could signal to banks that a firm takes the
misreporting seriously and is willing to take significant steps to restore its credibility.5
If banks view such replacements as credible signals by misreporting firms that they
have taken all necessary steps to ensure veracity going forward, firms that make such
replacements should have stigmas that are less severe and/or last for shorter time
periods following restatement. In the nearest neighbor matching approach for these
analyses, we require the matched firms to have similar firm and loan characteristics
and also to have replaced the respective parties that we study. For example, when
we examine the subsample of misreporting firms that promptly replaced their CEOs,
we require matched firms to have also replaced their CEOs in the same year.
We find support for the hypothesis that prompt replacement of parties potentially
related to the misreporting reduces the duration of the misreporting stigma, but the
effects are limited to certain parties. Misreporting firms that promptly replace the
chairs of their audit committees see reductions in their loan spreads to matched
firm levels by the third post-restatement year. Misreporting firms that promptly
5Although some audit committee chairs and external auditors might have actively participated in
misreporting, we include them in the set of potentially related parties primarily because outsiders
may view the event of misreporting as a failure by these parties to prevent or detect misreporting
before financial statements were released to outsiders.
8replace their external auditors also see reductions in their loan spreads to matched
firm levels by the third post-restatement year. Despite the apparent mitigating
effects of promptly replacing audit committee chairs and external auditors, a majority
of misreporting firms do not promptly replace these parties and continue to pay
significant misreporting premiums for at least four years after their restatements.
The results for prompt replacements of CEOs and CFOs differ from those of the
other parties. Misreporting firms that promptly replace their CEOs continue to pay
misreporting premiums over matched firms even five years after their restatements.
Misreporting firms that promptly replace their CFOs pay misreporting premiums
over matched firms even in the fourth post-restatement year. The majority of misre-
porting firms do not promptly replace their CEO or their CFO, and pay a significantly
greater spreads than matched firms for five years following their restatements.
A potential explanation of the greater post-restatement spreads for misreporting
firms is that the pre-restatement banks discontinue relationships with the misre-
porting firms, which forces the firms to establish new bank relationships in the post-
restatement period. The new bank relationships may translate into greater screening
and monitoring costs that are then reflected in loan spreads. The observed premi-
ums in post-restatement loan spreads are not driven by new bank relationships: the
subset of misreporting firms that continue existing bank relationships into the post-
restatement period pay higher spreads up to at least the fifth post-restatement year.
We also address the concern that our findings are based on differences in unobserv-
able firm fundamentals not captured by our loan spread models. Using a censored
selection model that accounts for a firm’s choice to misreport, our results remain
statistically and economically significant.
Collectively, the results are consistent with the view that misreporting creates a
long-lasting and costly stigma that causes banks to question the credibility of the
firms’ future reported financial information, and perhaps more generally, the veracity
of firms. As a result, banks face greater screening and monitoring costs, and thus
9charge a significant misreporting premium in loan spreads. Prompt replacement of
certain parties potentially related to the misreporting shortens the duration of the
stigma, but a majority of firms do not make such prompt replacements and pay
misreporting premiums for at least four to five years following their restatements.
The long-lasting stigma evident in loan spreads suggests that banks place great
importance on the truthfulness of information provided by firms. The results are
broadly consistent with Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b) that the reputation costs
of misreporting (defined as the portion of total penalty in addition to that imposed
by legal systems) are large economically.6 Our research complements the findings of
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) and extends those of Farber (2005) and Agrawal and
Cooper (2009) to the bank loans market.
Section 2.1 describes our data. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 examine respectively the
effects of misreporting on loan spreads among misreporting firms and compared to
matched non-misreporting firms. Section 2.4 examines the effects of changes in var-
ious parties who are potentially related to the restatements. Section 2.5 provides
robustness checks of the main results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1.1 Data Sources
Financial Restatements
We obtain a sample of restatements from two reports released by the U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO). The first report, released in October of 2002,
covers 919 restatements that occurred between January 1, 1997 and June 30, 2002.
6According to Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b), this expected loss due to reputation costs stems
from the lower sales and higher contracting/financing costs associated with the restatement event.
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The second report, released in July of 2006, covers 1390 restatements that occurred
between July 1, 2002 and September 30, 2005. At the end of August 2006, the GAO
published a supplementary file to the 2006 report with an additional 396 restate-
ments from October 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006. There are a total of 2705 restatements
in these reports.
Restatements in the GAO database represent cases in which the original mis-
reporting stemmed from fraud (intentional) and cases that stem from apparently
unintentional errors. Differential stock price reactions to the two types of restate-
ment announcements suggest economic differences between them (Hennes, Leone,
and Miller, 2008; Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004). Given the nature of our
research questions, we focus our analysis primarily on the subset of GAO restate-
ments that are classified as “irregularities” by Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008).
Their classification procedure is based on a series of criteria. A restatement is classi-
fied as “irregular” if in the announcement or in any relevant filings in the four years
surrounding the restatement, (1) the firm uses the words or any variants of the words
“fraud” and “irregular” to refer to the event, or (2) the restatement itself is related
to investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or
the Department of Justice.7 (3) For other non-SEC independent investigations docu-
mented in the public filings, Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) conduct a case-by-case
analysis and classify as “irregular” where appropriate.8
Beginning with the 2705 restatements from the GAO reports, we follow Graham,
Li, and Qiu (2008) in retaining only one restatement per firm in our sample to avoid
issues created by the potential overlapping of pre- and post-restatement windows
7See Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991) for a discussion of SEC enforcement of accounting and
auditing-related infractions.
8We thank Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) for generously providing classifications
of irregular restatements. The data are available on Andrew J. Leone’s website at
http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/.
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when analyzing firms with multiple restatements. Instead of simply considering the
first restatement as the restatement of interest for a single firm as in Graham, Li,
and Qiu (2008), however, we consider the first irregular restatement when applicable
as our restatement of interest for that firm. Next, we require that these restate-
ment firms have the requisite data (discussed below) in Compustat and DealScan
databases.
Approximately 37% of misreporting firms that have loans in the pre-restatement
period have no loans in the post-restatement period (based on DealScan data). It is
possible that these firms suffer such a misreporting stigma that they are effectively
shut out of the credit market. If so, one can view our findings of a misreporting
premium among the firms that do have post-restatement loans as a lower bound
estimate of the effects of a misreporting stigma. Alternatively, the excluded firms
may simply not need bank financing or any external financing because they have
low investment opportunities or because they have sufficient internal cash flow to
support investment. It is difficult to examine these questions because in the post-
restatement period only about 7% (20% of the 37%) have Compustat data for the
five post-restatement years we examine. Although analysis of these firms may shed
light on the effect of misreporting on access to credit markets, we exclude them from
our study because the analyses in this paper require that firms receive loans in the
post-restatement period.
For our regression analysis, we require that all firms receive loans both prior to
and after their restatement dates so that the comparison between pre- and post-
restatement costs of debt is somewhat balanced. Thus, our final “restricted” sample
of loan deals for regression analysis consists of 3882 loans made to 455 unique firms
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from 1989 to 2007.9 Our primary focus in this part of the study is on the set of
irregular restatements, which includes 1316 loans made to 140 firms.
For our matched analysis, we do not restrict firms to have both pre- and post-
restatement loans because (1) we only conduct our matched analysis for post-event
loans and (2) of sample size issues. Our final “unrestricted” sample for matched
analysis consists of 701 post-restatement loans issued to 185 firms that are associated
with irregular restatements, of which 626 loans issued to 180 firms take place within
the first five post-restatement years.10
Bank Loans
Bank loan data are from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan database.
The main source of data provided in DealScan is firms’ SEC filings. The basic unit
of observation in the database is a loan (also known as facility or tranche in the
database) involving one borrower and one or more lenders.11
Our key variable of interest is the natural log of loan spread. Following Graham,
Li, and Qiu (2008) and Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009), we obtain the
all-in spread drawn from the DealScan database. This variable measures the amount
the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR (or LIBOR equivalent) for each dollar
drawn down and includes any annual fees (or facility fees) paid to the bank or bank
9When we restrict the sample to restatements in the first GAO report, the sample closely matches
that in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008). Our replication of the loan spread regressions in Table 3 of
their paper is available upon request.
10A restricted version of this sample, where we require that all firms receive loans both prior to
and after their restatement dates, consists of 533 post-restatement loans made to the 140 firms. In
this restricted sample, there are 479 post-restatement loans issued to 138 firms during the first five
post-restatement years. Our results do not change qualitatively when using this restricted sample
to test our hypotheses.
11Chava and Roberts (2008) discuss details of firm level matching between DealScan and Compustat.
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group. Not all loans are priced off of LIBOR; for those that are not, the variable is
converted into LIBOR terms by the LPC using a periodically adjusted differential.
Our analyses control for various loan specific characteristics that are taken from
the DealScan database. These characteristics include: the natural log of maturity;
the natural log of loan size; whether the loan has a performance-pricing feature; the
loan type (e.g., revolvers above and below one year, term loans, 364-day loans, etc.),
and the deal purpose (e.g., corporate, repayment, takeover, and working capital).
Panel A of Table 2.1 contains a list of loan-specific variables and their definitions.
Turnover Information
Our analysis of the effects of replacing various parties potentially related to the
misreporting events requires turnover data on CEOs, CFOs, audit committee chairs,
and external auditors. Following Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008), we define our
change determination window as the thirteen-month period centered on the restate-
ment announcement month. A turnover for a particular party (e.g., a CEO) is
recorded if, during this determination window, one or more turnovers of that party
occurred. We extract turnover information for CEOs and CFOs from ExecuComp,
for audit committee chairs from RiskMetrics, and for external auditors from Audit-
Analytics.
The turnover analysis for CEOs and external auditors is straightforward, given
the nature of the source databases. The annual position flag, start date, and end
date for CEOs are relatively accurate and complete in the ExecuComp database.
Similarly, for changes in external auditors, the exact change dates are given in the
auditor change file from the AuditAnalytics database.12
12The auditor change file from the AuditAnalytics database, though offering accurate turnover
dates, provides data only for 2000 and beyond.
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Table 2.1
Variable Definitions for Section 2.
This table presents definitions of variables used in Section 2, “Why Won’t You Forgive Me? Evidence of a Financial Misreporting Stigma in Bank Loan Pricing.” The unit of observation
within the sample is a loan, which we refer to as “the loan” in the definitions. The borrower of the loan is referred to as “the borrower” or “the borrowing firm.”
Panel A: Loan Specific Variables
lnspread Natural log of the all-in drawn spread (measured in basis points) charged on the loan; all-in drawn spread is defined as the borrowing
spread of the loan over LIBOR (or equivalent)
restatepost Dummy variable indicating whether the facility start date of the loan is after the financial restatement announcement date for the
borrower of the loan
restatepost(p) Indicator variable stating whether the start date of the loan is during the pth year after the financial restatement announcement date
for the borrower of the loan for p = 1 to 5, or after the 5th post-restatement year for p = 6; p is an integer from 1 to 6
fraud Interaction term of the post-restatement indicator restatepost with another dummy variable indicating whether the borrower of the
loan is associated with an irregular restatement; irregularity is classified using the method of Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008)
lnt Natural log of maturity (measured in months) for the loan
lnloansize Natural log of the amount borrowed (measured in $millions) in the loan contract
perfprice Binary variable indicating whether the loan employs performance pricing clause
Panel B: Firm Specific Variables
lnassets The natural log of total assets (measured in $millions) for the borrowing firm of the loan
mb Market-to-book ratio of total assets for the borrower, calculated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt scaled
by total assets
leverage Leverage ratio of the borrower, defined as the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets
profitability Profitability of the borrower, defined as EBITDA over total assets
tangibility Tangibility of the borrower, defined as net PP&E scaled by total assets
cfvol Cash flow volatility of the borrowing firm, measured by the standard deviation of quarterly net cash flow from operating activities,
as derived from the cumulative account oancfy of the quarterly fundamentals file of Compustat, for the past four fiscal years before
the start date of a loan, scaled by the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt
modzscore Modified Altman z-score of the borrower
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variables
crdtsprd Credit spread, defined as the difference between AAA and BAA corporate bond yields
termsprd Term spread, defined as the difference between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields
econboom Dummy variable indicating whether the loan starts during the economic boom period between 1996 and 2000, inclusive, as defined
by Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008)
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The identification of turnover for CFOs and audit committee chairs warrants
additional discussion. In identifying CFO changes, we face two empirical limitations.
First, the annual CFO flag field in ExecuComp is relatively incomplete. Second,
unlike CEO information in the database, there are no exact dates of when the CFOs
enter or leave office. We solve the first problem by using a string search method
through executive annual titles, similar to the approach employed by Chava and
Purnanandam (2009). Specifically, in addition to any available annual CFO flags,
we search for specific strings such as “CFO,” “FINANCE,” “TREASURER,” and
“CONTROLLER” through executive annual titles. We assign scores to each string
so that the individual who is most likely the CFO of a given year would have the
highest score (e.g., “CFO” is assigned a score of 10). We also search for other words
that might be related to these strings (e.g., “FINANCIAL”). In cases where more
than one executive survive the string search and share the same score from the string
search, we take the one with the highest annual compensation as the CFO of the
firm. Having identified the set of CFOs and their links to firms, we attempt to solve
the second problem by approximating the start (end) date of a CFO for a certain
firm by the earliest (latest) fiscal year begin (end) date for any sequence of fiscal
years in which the person is classified as the CFO of that firm.
The set of audit committee chairs are extracted from the directors file of Risk-
Metrics. We identify a board member as the chair of audit committee for her firm
during a certain fiscal year if that person is in charge as of the board meeting date
for the next fiscal year. As with our approach for CFOs, we approximate the start
and end dates of an audit committee chair for a certain firm by the earliest and
latest fiscal year begin and end dates, respectively, when the person is classified as
the audit committee chair of that firm.13
13The directors file of RiskMetrics provides coverage beginning in 1996, however, data for audit
committee chair is not available until 1999 and beyond.
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As we discuss later, we use a nearest neighbor matching estimator approach
for much of our empirical analysis. Thus, we identify the replacement events of
the potential related parties for the sample of misreporting firms and for all non-
misreporting firms that compose the set of potential matches. Because we need all
replacement events for all non-misreporting firms that compose the set of poten-
tial matches, hand collecting data items missing from the respective databases is
infeasible.
Firm Level and Macroeconomic Controls
We extract firm level data from Compustat to control for firm specific charac-
teristics that have been shown to be determinants of loan spreads. We include the
natural log of total assets as a proxy for firm size because we expect larger firms
to have easier access to external financing and have lower asymmetric information
problems (and therefore lower monitoring costs). We use the market-to-book ratio
of assets (sum of market value of equity and book value of debt scaled by book
value of total assets) to indicate growth opportunities, which we expect to be neg-
atively related to loan spread. We control for default risk with three variables: (i)
book leverage ratio (sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by total assets),
(ii) profitability (EBITDA over total assets), and (iii) modified Altman’s (1968) z-
score.14 We expect firms with higher default risk (i.e., higher leverage ratios, lower
profitability, and/or lower z-scores) to pay higher loan spreads. We control for asset
tangibility (net PP&E, scaled by total assets) and predict a negative relation with
loan spread because tangible assets can likely be recovered at greater rates in the
14The modified z-score is defined as (1.2 * wcap + 1.4 * re + 3.3 * pi + 0.999 * sale)/at
in terms of Compustat items names. We use the modified z-score instead of the traditional version
of Altman (1968) in our analysis because we are also controlling for the market-to-book ratio of
total assets. See Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008).
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event of default. We use cash flow volatility (standard deviation of quarterly net cash
flow from operating activities for the prior four fiscal years before the start date of
a loan, scaled by the sum of long-term and short-term debt) as a proxy for earnings
risk and expect it to be positively related to loan spread. We also control for industry
effects using indicator variables based on the two-digit SIC codes. Details regarding
firm-level variable definitions and construction are in Panel B of Table 2.1.
We obtain macroeconomic control variables from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (http://www.federalreserve.gov/). We construct (1) credit
spread as the difference between AAA and BAA corporate bond yields, and (2) term
spread as the difference between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields. These measures
serve as proxies for macroeconomic conditions and have been shown to be related
to bond market returns (Chen, Roll, and Ross, 1986; Fama and French, 1993). We
also include an indicator for loans made during the 1996 to 2000 economic boom
period as an additional macro-level control. A summary of macroeconomic variable
definitions is in Panel C of Table 2.1.
Throughout our study, all nominal variables are adjusted to January 2006 dollars
using the consumer price index (CPI) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the U.S. Department of Labor (http://www.bls.gov/). We winsorize loan and firm-
specific variables at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce potential problems created by
outliers.
2.1.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample before and after the re-
statements. Panel A contains descriptive statistics for the entire GAO restatements
sample, while Panel B has statistics for only restatements identified as “irregular” ac-
cording to Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008). We focus discussion on statistics for the
irregularities subsample. We also present the results of difference in mean and me-
dian tests, based on mean-per-firm level observations (i.e., pre-restatement loans for
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a given firm are averaged to form one observation, and likewise for post-restatement
loans).
The mean (median) pre-restatement loan spread of 161 basis points (bps) (125bps)
increases significantly to 261bps (250bps) in the post-restatement period (p-value <
0.01). At the median, the increase is a doubling of the loan spread, which suggests
that misreporting has a large effect economically. A smaller but still statistically sig-
nificant increase in loan spread from pre-restatement to post-restatement is evident
for the full GAO sample (in Panel A). The magnitudes of the increases in mean and
median spreads confirm the importance of distinguishing irregular restatements from
those categorized as errors based on Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008).
As shown in Panel B, there are also statistically significant increases in mean and
median loan maturity, and significant decreases in loan-to-asset ratio and the loan
syndicate size. Post restatement loans are significantly more likely to be secured than
are pre-restatement loans. Mean loan size and the proportion of loans with perfor-
mance pricing features do not differ significantly across the pre and post-restatement
periods.
Mean and median firm size (total assets) and leverage are significantly larger in
the post-restatement period than in the pre-restatement period. The magnitude of
the increase in firm size reflects in part the fact that larger firms have a relatively
greater number of post-restatement loans than smaller firms do; untabulated results
using mean-per-firm level observations show a smaller increase in firm size. Mean and
median market-to-book assets, profitability, and tangibility show significant decreases
from the pre to post-restatement periods. Mean cash flow volatility does not differ
significantly across the pre and post-restatement periods.
In summary, there are significant differences in important loan and firm charac-
teristics across the pre and post-restatement periods. Macroeconomic characteristics
may also differ across a firm’s pre and post-restatement periods. Given these differ-
ences, we next move to regressions and a matched analysis to examine the effects
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Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics for Section 2.
This table presents pre- and post-restatement descriptive statistics for loan and firm specific variables of the main sample. Panel A presents information for the all financial restatements
within the GAO database, while Panel B presents that for the irregularities subset within the GAO restatements. Irregularity is defined according to Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008). The
difference in mean and median tests are computed using mean-per-firm level observations (loans for a given firm in each period are averaged into one observation).
Before Restatement After Restatement Paired Diff p-val
N Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median
Panel A: Full GAO Sample
Loan Specific Variables
Loan Spread (Basis Points) 2330 172.21 150.00 137.26 1552 223.25 200.00 167.93 0.00 0.00
Maturity (Months) 2330 42.04 36.00 23.54 1552 45.25 51.00 22.90 0.00 0.00
Loan Size (Millions USD) 2330 326.89 154.20 485.30 1552 452.71 205.42 621.31 0.00 0.00
Loan-to-Asset Ratio 2330 0.24 0.15 0.27 1552 0.19 0.12 0.28 0.00 0.00
Performance Pricing? 2330 0.49 0.00 0.50 1552 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.17 0.18
Secured Loan? 1589 0.69 1.00 0.46 1166 0.76 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.00
Syndicate Size 2330 9.06 6.00 9.39 1552 8.70 6.00 8.19 0.37 0.33
Firm Specific Variables
Total Assets (Millions USD) 2330 3749.60 885.46 6742.31 1552 5598.86 1569.98 8972.94 0.00 0.00
Market-to-Book Assets 2330 1.78 1.46 0.99 1552 1.66 1.38 0.87 0.00 0.00
Leverage Ratio 2330 0.32 0.29 0.21 1552 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.02 0.19
Profitability 2330 0.14 0.13 0.08 1552 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.00
Tangibility 2330 0.36 0.32 0.23 1552 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.00
Cash Flow Volatility 2330 0.73 0.09 2.83 1552 0.62 0.08 2.63 0.12 0.15
Panel B: Irregularities Sample
Loan Specific Variables
Loan Spread (Basis Points) 783 160.83 125.00 130.64 533 260.63 250.00 176.72 0.00 0.00
Maturity (Months) 783 40.89 36.00 23.31 533 44.58 48.00 23.59 0.01 0.00
Loan Size (Millions USD) 783 417.31 189.53 594.37 533 519.81 222.21 690.95 0.10 0.07
Loan-to-Asset Ratio 783 0.23 0.15 0.25 533 0.17 0.11 0.29 0.00 0.00
Performance Pricing? 783 0.47 0.00 0.50 533 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.22 0.33
Secured Loan? 518 0.68 1.00 0.47 412 0.81 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.00
Syndicate Size 783 10.89 7.00 10.85 533 8.86 6.00 8.97 0.01 0.03
Firm Specific Variables
Total Assets (Millions USD) 783 4857.17 1164.45 7701.29 533 6762.24 1702.88 9773.85 0.00 0.00
Market-to-Book Assets 783 1.87 1.53 1.09 533 1.61 1.35 0.88 0.00 0.00
Leverage Ratio 783 0.31 0.28 0.20 533 0.36 0.32 0.23 0.00 0.00
Profitability 783 0.14 0.14 0.07 533 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.00
Tangibility 783 0.30 0.28 0.19 533 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.01 0.00
Cash Flow Volatility 783 0.55 0.09 2.27 533 0.42 0.07 2.02 0.24 0.13
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of restatements on loan spreads while controlling for loan, firm, and macroeconomic
characteristics.
2.2 Loan Spread Regressions
2.2.1 Full GAO Sample and Irregular Restatements
We first estimate regressions to examine the change in spreads following restate-
ments, while controlling for other firm level and loan level characteristics that may
have changed following the restatement. We begin with a replication of Graham, Li,
and Qiu’s (2008) findings on our expanded sample. Our regression model is specified
as follows:
yin = αd
post
in +X
′
inBˆ+ ǫin, (2.1)
where the dependent variable yin is the natural log of loan spread for loan n made
to firm i and dpostin is the post-restatement indicator for that loan, taking the value
of one for loans made after the announcements of financial restatements and zero for
loans issued before the announcements. Xin denotes the vector of firm and loan level
covariates as of the facility start date of the loan, along with a constant. The key
explanatory variable of interest is the post-restatement indicator dpostin . Given that
the dependent variable is the natural log of the loan spread, the estimated coefficient
on the post-restatement indicator variable, α, can be interpreted as the percentage
increase in post-restatement loan spread over pre-restatement levels beyond that
explained by firm and loan level controls specified in Xin. All standard errors are
heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm.
We first estimate regressions for the full sample of GAO restatements from 1997 to
2006 and present results for regressions estimated over the subsample of the irregular-
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type restatements in Table 2.3.15 The specifications are generally as employed by
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), except for the sample period being extended and our
industry fixed effects being defined at the two-digit SIC level, rather than the one-
digit level in their base specifications. Other studies, such as Bradley and Roberts
(2003) and Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009), use similar specifications.
Model 1 simply gives the effect of the post-restatement dummy itself alone on
the natural log of loan spread. In models 2 through 4, we add incrementally firm
characteristics, loan specific variables, and macro-economic controls. Model 5 adds
variables to capture industry, loan type, and deal purpose fixed effects. In model 6
we include firm fixed effects instead of industry effects, and the results are similar
to those in model 5.16 Comparing our results to those presented in Graham, Li,
and Qiu (2008), the adverse effect of financial misreporting on bank loan pricing are
economically consistent and accord with the intuition that firms that intentionally
misreport financial information should see more adverse effects on loan pricing than
firms that have error-related accounting restatements. The results are also consistent
with the differences in abnormal returns around the restatement announcement date
documented by Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) and Palmrose, Richardson, and
Scholz (2004) for irregular restatements versus error-related restatements.
Throughout the regressions, the signs and magnitudes of coefficient estimates on
the firm, loan, and macro level control variables are generally as expected and in
line with results from prior studies. Larger firms, firms with higher market-to-book
ratio, and more profitable firms have lower loan spreads, whereas firms with higher
leverage and cash flow volatility pay higher loan spreads. Also as expected, firms
15We do not tabulate replication results to conserve space. For the time period and sample consid-
ered in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), we are also able to closely replicate their findings.
16One might be concerned about firms switching industries throughout the sample period. In
untabulated results, we estimated the same regression as models 5 and 6 of Table 2.3 with both
industry and firm fixed effects included. The results are similar to those reported.
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Table 2.3
Loan Spread Regressions.
This table presents replication results of loan spread OLS regressions from Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) using the extended data, containing all loans made to restatement firms which are
found in the two full GAO reports (recording restatements which occurred between January of 1997 and June of 2006). The regression models show the effect of financial restatements on cost
of bank debt. The dependent variable in all models is the natural log of all-drawn loan spread. Models are estimated using only those made to firms associated with irregular restatements.
The main explanatory variables is restatepost, a dummy variable indicating whether the loan facility start date is after the date for which the corresponding financial restatement occurred.
Model 1 examines the effect of the restatepost dummy alone, while models 2 to 5 incrementally adds to model 1 firm specific controls, loan specific controls, macroeconomic level controls,
and fixed effects, respectively. Industry fixed effects are according to the 2-digit SIC codes. Loan type (revolvers less or greater than 1 year, term loans, 364-day loans, etc.) and deal purpose
(corporate, repayment, takeover, working capital, etc.) fixed effects control for additional loan characteristics. Model 6 replaces industry fixed effects in model 5 with firm fixed effects. All
models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. Definitions and details for each variable can be found in Table 2.1.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val
restatepost 0.5721 (6.23) 0.4292 (5.93) 0.4222 (5.68) 0.3737 (4.76) 0.3432 (4.92) 0.3627 (4.82)
lnassets -0.2248 (-10.97) -0.1752 (-4.91) -0.2042 (-5.89) -0.1759 (-5.99) -0.0699 (-1.36)
mb -0.1170 (-3.77) -0.1171 (-3.80) -0.1048 (-3.21) -0.0574 (-2.22) -0.0496 (-1.46)
leverage 0.9532 (5.72) 0.9439 (5.60) 0.9141 (5.53) 0.6574 (5.36) 0.5744 (2.31)
profitability -2.5033 (-5.46) -2.2799 (-4.96) -2.2921 (-5.16) -2.5048 (-6.51) -2.1385 (-4.05)
tangibility 0.2778 (1.31) 0.3038 (1.48) 0.3344 (1.68) 0.0829 (0.32) 0.1796 (0.51)
cfvol 0.0235 (2.47) 0.0216 (2.26) 0.0203 (2.20) 0.0157 (1.78) 0.0068 (0.86)
modzscore -0.0768 (-2.69) -0.0704 (-2.52) -0.0630 (-2.21) -0.0294 (-1.18) 0.0119 (0.23)
lnt 0.0611 (1.96) 0.0690 (2.20) -0.1081 (-2.93) -0.0983 (-2.42)
lnloansize -0.0697 (-1.83) -0.0400 (-1.10) -0.0185 (-0.61) -0.0397 (-1.37)
perfprice -0.0814 (-1.55) -0.0864 (-1.61) -0.0380 (-0.79) -0.0813 (-1.53)
crdtsprd 0.6232 (5.03) 0.6248 (5.52) 0.4732 (3.96)
termsprd 0.0662 (1.74) 0.0806 (2.80) 0.1128 (3.43)
econboom -0.0030 (-0.04) -0.0234 (-0.34) -0.0396 (-0.53)
intercept 4.7281 (57.82) 6.6528 (42.47) 6.4330 (37.46) 5.8725 (26.47) 4.8862 (18.22) 5.1225 (12.44)
R2 0.096 0.504 0.513 0.541 0.661 0.746
N 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316
Firms 140 140 140 140 140 140
Fixed Effects
Loan Type No No No No Yes Yes
Deal Purpose No No No No Yes Yes
Industry No No No No Yes No
Firm No No No No No Yes
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with lower financial distress risk, as indicated by the modified Altman’s (1968) z-
score, pay lower spreads. For loan specific characteristics, loans of longer maturity
and larger amount are associated with lower spreads.
In summary, we replicate on an expanded sample Graham, Li, and Qiu’s (2008)
findings that firms pay greater loan spreads following restatements, and that the
effect is larger for irregular restatements (i.e., those that stem from apparently in-
tentional misreporting based on the classification scheme of Hennes, Leone, and
Miller, 2008). We next turn to tests of the hypothesis that misreporting creates a
long-lasting and costly stigma evident in bank loan spreads. Given the nature of
our research questions, the remainder of our analysis uses only the set of irregular
restatements.
2.2.2 How Long Do Firms Pay a Misreporting Premium?
This section extends the analysis in the prior section to examine how long firms
continue to pay higher spreads on their bank loans after intentionally misreporting
their financial information. Instead of including one post-restatement indicator vari-
able in the regression specification, we include separate indicator variables for each
of the first five post-restatement years. The number of loans in years beyond +5
years is relatively small, so we combine loans that occur beyond the first five post-
restatement years into one indicator variable. We also include a separate indicator
variable for the year immediately preceding the restatement because Graham, Li,
and Qiu (2008) find evidence suggesting some degree of information leakage in the
period immediately prior to the restatement. We also include two-day abnormal
returns measured on firms’ restatement dates.17 The abnormal return measured on
17We present results for the two-day cumulative abnormal stock returns of days 0 and -1 of the
restatement announcement date. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported when we
use the (-1,0) or (-1,+1) window abnormal returns.
24
a restatement date should capture the relative severity and magnitude of the mis-
reporting, at least from the viewpoint of equity investors when they learn the new
(true) accounting figures. We estimate market-model parameters during the one-year
trading period ending 250 days prior to the restatement date.There is only one re-
statement announcement abnormal return per firm, so we can include the abnormal
return measure only in the models without firm fixed effects.
The results are in Table 2.4. Similar to the layout in the previous table, we include
in the first model only period indicators without any additional controls, and then
incrementally add into the specification firm specific controls, loan specific controls,
and macroeconomic level controls. Model 5 adds loan type, deal purpose, and indus-
try fixed effects into the estimation, and Model 6 replaces industry fixed effects with
firm fixed effects. We observe that the adverse effect of irregular restatement events
on loan spread lasts for at least five years after the respective restatements. Using
model 6 as an example, where we include all firm, loan, and macro level controls and
firm, loan type, and deal purpose fixed effects, we observe percentage increases in
post-restatement spreads compared to pre-restatement levels of approximately 51%,
50%, 38%, 45%, and 23% for the first five post-restatement years, respectively. All
coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher. Additionally, the coefficient on
the indicator variable that combines loans in years six through ten is 35%, with a
t-statistic of 2.22.
Thus, the premium that misreporting firms pay in their loan spreads is long
lasting. As Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) note, a restatement can convey new infor-
mation that leads to downward revisions in cash flow and firm value estimates, and
also convey new information that causes capital suppliers to question the credibility
and veracity of a firm. It seems unlikely that restatements cause banks to continue
revising downward estimates of cash flow and value five year after the restatement,
so we interpret the long-lasting effect of restatements on loan spreads as consistent
with the hypothesis that misreporting creates a long-lasting and costly stigma.
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Table 2.4
Effect of Restatements on Loan Spread Over Time.
The table presents regression results showing the effect of financial restatements on cost of bank debt over time after the restatement announcement. All models are estimated using only
loans that are made to firms associated with irregular restatements, as classified by Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008). The dependent variable in all models is the natural log of all-drawn
loan spread. The main explanatory variables are restatepost(p), where p is an integer from 1 to 6, indicating whether the loan facility start date is during the pth post-restatement year for
p = 1 to 5, or after the 5th post-restatement year for p = 6. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. Model 1 examines the effect of the restatepost dummy
alone, while models 2 to 5 incrementally adds to model 1 firm specific controls, loan specific controls, macroeconomic level controls, and fixed effects, respectively. Industry fixed effects are
according to the 2-digit SIC codes. Loan type (revolvers less or greater than 1 year, term loans, 364-day loans, etc.) and deal purpose (corporate, repayment, takeover, working capital, etc.)
fixed effects control for additional loan characteristics. Model 6 replaces industry fixed effects from model 5 with firm fixed effects. Definitions and details for each variable can be found in
Table 2.1. The variable car restate is the two-day cumulative abnormal stock returns of days 0 and -1 of the restatement announcement date. Benchmarks for abnormal returns are obtained
by estimating the market model during the one-year trading period ending 950 days prior to the restatement date.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val Estimate t-val
restatepostn1 0.4750 (4.05) 0.4851 (5.29) 0.4984 (5.69) 0.4231 (4.61) 0.3447 (4.92) 0.2958 (3.72)
restatepost1 0.7568 (6.19) 0.6760 (5.88) 0.6684 (5.71) 0.6145 (5.32) 0.5223 (4.69) 0.5078 (4.40)
restatepost2 0.8779 (8.08) 0.6370 (6.16) 0.6236 (6.00) 0.5157 (4.87) 0.4715 (5.50) 0.5000 (5.08)
restatepost3 0.6170 (5.02) 0.3906 (4.21) 0.3850 (4.12) 0.3216 (3.13) 0.3179 (3.33) 0.3764 (3.77)
restatepost4 0.5847 (4.42) 0.4758 (4.33) 0.4704 (4.39) 0.3868 (3.38) 0.3856 (3.91) 0.4513 (3.85)
restatepost5 0.3249 (2.22) 0.3271 (3.09) 0.3110 (2.86) 0.2149 (1.86) 0.2345 (2.12) 0.2338 (2.01)
restatepost6 0.2473 (1.08) 0.3401 (2.30) 0.3411 (2.44) 0.2641 (1.80) 0.2589 (2.09) 0.3544 (2.22)
car restate -0.1464 (-0.32) -0.1155 (-0.41) -0.1272 (-0.48) -0.1469 (-0.58) -0.0067 (-0.03)
lnassets -0.2329 (-12.33) -0.1847 (-5.74) -0.2102 (-6.78) -0.1848 (-6.83) -0.1004 (-2.04)
mb -0.1262 (-4.56) -0.1243 (-4.50) -0.1113 (-3.89) -0.0670 (-2.84) -0.0495 (-1.43)
leverage 0.9116 (5.49) 0.8935 (5.38) 0.8820 (5.43) 0.6271 (4.77) 0.5028 (1.95)
profitability -2.0941 (-4.59) -1.9007 (-4.18) -1.9668 (-4.49) -2.1913 (-5.64) -1.9659 (-3.64)
tangibility 0.3059 (1.45) 0.3348 (1.63) 0.3564 (1.81) 0.1373 (0.54) 0.2317 (0.65)
cfvol 0.0232 (2.96) 0.0213 (2.74) 0.0202 (2.62) 0.0147 (1.80) 0.0066 (0.88)
modzscore -0.0769 (-2.83) -0.0711 (-2.68) -0.0639 (-2.34) -0.0318 (-1.33) 0.0077 (0.15)
lnt 0.0826 (2.79) 0.0860 (2.88) -0.0875 (-2.54) -0.0805 (-2.13)
lnloansize -0.0662 (-1.84) -0.0397 (-1.16) -0.0186 (-0.64) -0.0383 (-1.36)
perfprice -0.0850 (-1.73) -0.0861 (-1.71) -0.0408 (-0.88) -0.0877 (-1.68)
crdtsprd 0.5524 (4.34) 0.5643 (5.05) 0.4281 (3.89)
termsprd 0.0372 (1.03) 0.0578 (2.00) 0.0990 (3.00)
econboom -0.0582 (-0.78) -0.0572 (-0.82) -0.0545 (-0.67)
intercept 4.6431 (47.80) 6.5921 (43.40) 6.2908 (38.18) 5.8580 (27.31) 4.9123 (19.05) 5.2956 (13.83)
R2 0.139 0.535 0.545 0.567 0.674 0.755
N 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316
Firms 140 140 140 140 140 140
Fixed Effects
Loan Type No No No No Yes Yes
Deal Purpose No No No No Yes Yes
Industry No No No No Yes No
Firm No No No No No Yes
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The effects are also large economically. For example, there is a 51% increase in
spread for loans that are made during the one-year period after the restatement an-
nouncements compared to the ones that are made before. The mean pre-restatement
loan spread is 161bps for firms associated with irregular restatements, so the 51% in-
crease implies an additional 82bps cost of bank loans during the first post-restatement
year over the cost of pre-restatement loans. This can be interpreted as a “misreport-
ing premium” of 82bps higher spread for loans made during this year compared to
those made prior to the event announcement. In dollar terms, with a mean post-
restatement loan size of $520 million and an average maturity of 45 months, the
increased cost to firms due to these spread increases is about $16 million per loan
during this first post-restatement year. Following this same logic, we can see that
the marginal dollar cost during the second year is also about $16 million per loan.
For years 3 and 4 of the same model, the same calculations generate figures of $12
million and $14 million, respectively. For year 5 (beyond year 5), point estimates
imply marginal dollar costs of $7 million ($11 million).18
Similar to results in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), we find evidence of information
leakage in the period immediately prior to the restatement: the coefficient on the
year −1 indicator variable is 0.2958 (p-value < 0.01). Although statistically and
economically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than for the
years immediately following the restatement. This indicates that the restatement
event itself has a material marginal effect on loan spreads.
Results for the control variables are generally as expected and in line with re-
sults from prior studies. Notably, however, the restatement announcement abnormal
return variable that we include to capture the severity of the misreporting is not
18In untabulated results, we estimated the same model for our non-irregularities sample (firms
whose restatements stem from unintentional errors). The estimated coefficients are all below 20%,
indicating much smaller spread increases for misreporting that was apparently due to errors. These
results are available from the authors upon request.
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statistically significant in any of the regressions that include it. To the extent that
the abnormal return variable does capture the severity of the misreporting, the lack
of significance implies that banks are more concerned with the mere fact that a firm
misreported.
In sum, using loan spread models similar to those in extant literature, we find
that irregular restatements result in significant premiums in bank loan spreads over
pre-restatement levels. The larger spreads are economically significant and continue
for at least five years following the restatements. Given average loan sizes, the effects
translate into millions of dollars in additional interest costs per loan.
2.3 Matched Analysis
2.3.1 Bias-corrected Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimator
In the previous section, we compare post-restatement loan spreads to pre-restatement
loans spreads among the set of misreporting firms. The analysis shows a significant
spread increase in the post-restatement period that lasts at least five years. In this
section, we examine the effect of misreporting on loan spreads using a matched
loan-matched firm approach. Specifically, for each post-restatement loan made by
a misreporting firm (treatment loan), we find a non-misreporting control firm-loan
during the same year that (1) is of the same loan type, same deal purpose, and within
the same industry at the two-digit SIC level, if possible, and (2) has the minimum
weighted distance to the treatment loan, based on firm and loan level covariates, out
of all potential candidates. That is, for the vector of firm and loan characteristic
covariates Xinp of loan n issued to misreporting firm i during p¯ (where is p¯ is defined
relative to the firm’s restatement date), we search for a loan m made to a non-
misreporting firm j, with covariates Xjmp during that same year p¯ that minimizes a
distance function, denoted as D(Xinp, Xjmp; p = p¯). Specifically,
Xjmp = arg min
Xjmp
D(Xinp, Xjmp; p = p¯), m /∈ N, (2.2)
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where the distance function, defined as
D(Xinp, Xjmp; p = p¯) ≡ [(Xinp −Xjmp)
′VX(Xinp −Xjmp)]
1
2 , p = p¯, (2.3)
is essentially the Euclidean norm of vector Xinp − Xjmp with p fixed to p¯. VX is a
positive definite, diagonal weighting matrix consisting of inverse variances of each
element in the characteristics vector (i.e., the matching dimensions). N denotes the
set of treatment loans (i.e., loans made to misreporting firms). Note that in the above
illustration, firm subscripts i and j can be dropped since loan subscripts n and m
are already sufficient in describing the treatment and control samples of loans. We
retain them, however, for ease of discussion. We perform a one-to-one match for
each treatment loan, so a single misreporting firm may have more than one matched
firms. Our matches are drawn from the pool of potential controls with replacement,
so some treatment loans may share a matched control loan. Choosing matches with
replacement ensures the closest possible matches across the sample observations.
Using simple matching estimators with inexact matches in a finite sample can
produce bias in the estimated treatment minus control loan difference. Thus, we
follow Rubin (1973) and Abadie and Imbens (2006) in adjusting the difference within
matches for differences in the values of matching covariates. We first approximate
control spreads on the matched observations yˆjmp, that is,
yˆjmp = X
′
jmpBˆ
JM
p (2.4)
for some fixed period p = p¯, where the coefficients vector Bˆp satisfies the linear least
squares function
BˆJMp = argmin
BJMp
∑
jmp
kjmp
(
yjmp −X
′
jmpB
JM
p
)2
;m ∈M, p = p¯. (2.5)
Control loan m belongs to the set M of matched control observations for treatment
loans in N . kjmp denotes the number of times that a certain loan m ∈ M to firm
j during year p relative to the restatement announcement date is being used as a
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match. The set of potential outcomes for the treatment sample can then be written
as  y˜
C
inp = yjmp − yˆjmp +X
′
inpBˆ
JM
p
y˜Tinp = yinp
(2.6)
for our bias-corrected matching estimator, where BˆJMp is defined as in Equation 2.5.
Note that in the above set of potential outcomes, we implicitly set the number of
matches for each treatment observation to one given our main setup, as mentioned
earlier.19 We tested the yearly average treatment effect using one to four matches
per treatment observation, and for each test the results are qualitatively similar to
those reported.
Finally, the average treatment effect τ of period p for our sample of loans made
to misreporting firms can be written as
τp =
1
Np
∑
inp
[
yinp − y˜
C
inp
]
, (2.7)
where Np denotes the total number of observations in the misreporting firm sample of
loans during event year p. Intuitively, spreads charged on loans issued to misreporting
firms are captured by the observed yinp in Equation 2.7, while spreads charged on
loans issued to these firms had they not misreported are approximated by y˜Cinp.
20
2.3.2 Year-by-year Spread Differences
Following the above procedure, we estimate the average treatment minus control
difference in the natural log of spreads for our sample of loans made to misreporting
19If we denote the number of matches for treatment loan n by n# and some control loan for n asmn,
then the untreated outcome in Equation 2.6 becomes y˜Cinp =
1
n#
∑
mn
[
yjmp − yˆjmp +X
′
inpBˆ
JM
p
]
.
20A recent paper by Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2009) also uses this matching
estimator to test if firms in need of refinancing long-term debt during a credit crisis alter decisions
related to real-side variables.
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firms during each of the five post-restatement years following the announcement
dates, and for years six through eight combined. There are 626 loans made to 180
firms that had irregular restatements in the five post-restatement years, and 66 loans
made to 31 firms in years six through eight. The results of our matched analysis are
in Panel A of Table 2.5. The abbreviation “SATT” in the table stands for “sample
average treatment effect for the treated,” which is simply τp for each period p as we
define in Equation 2.7. As in the previous section, a year-one loan indicates that
the loan was initiated within one year of the restatement date, a year-two loan was
initiated between one and two years after the restatement, and so on for p out to
five. For sample size reasons, we combine years six through eight into one group and
report results for it.
As shown in Panel A of Table 2.5, misreporting firms pay loan spreads signifi-
cantly greater than do matched firms in each of the first five post-restatement years.
The spread differences over matched firms are 53%, 35%, 31%, 30%, and 34% for
the first through the fifth post-restatement years, respectively. Each difference is
statistically significant with a p-value < 0.01. Not surprisingly, the greatest spread
difference occurs in the year immediately following the restatement announcement.
Using the first year spread difference as an example, and recalling from Table 2.2 that
spreads charged on loans during the post-restatement period for firms engaging in
irregular restatements average 261bps (median 250bps), the implied spread without
the 53% misreporting premium is 170bps (median 163bps). Given an average post-
restatement loan size of $520 million and mean maturity of 45 months, the estimated
treatment effect is also economically significant.21
21The estimated treatment effects are generally larger in magnitude than the coefficient estimates
for the multivariate regression models shown in Table 2.4. The regression models are estimated
within the restating firm sample and compare misreporting firms’ spreads pre and post-restatement.
Given Graham, Li, and Qiu’s (2008) evidence of information leakage in bank loan spreads before the
restatement itself, which we confirm, the smaller estimated differences of post-restatement minus
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Table 2.5
Matched Analysis and Placebo Test.
This table presents results from loan-level matched analysis for the effects of irregular restatements
on the cost of private debt. Panel A shows year-by-year estimations for the difference between the
log of spreads charged on loans made to restatement firms and log of spreads charged on loans
made to non-restatement firms. Irregularity is defined as in Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008).
During each of the five post-restatement years surrounding the restatement announcement, a bias-
corrected matching technique based on the nearest neighbor estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006)
is employed at the loan level. Post-restatement loans are sorted according to the year relative to
the restatement announcement date and categorized into one of the five years surrounding the
announcement dates. For each loan in each year of the restatements sample, a matching loan,
based on loan and firm level characteristics, is located with replacement. Panel B presents results
of a placebo test, where the estimation method as demonstrated in Panel A is employed on an
alternative set of loans made to 150 non-restatement firms. Non-restatement firms for the placebo
test are randomly selected from the universe of non-restating firms with valid loan and firm level
information. A date between the first and last loan start dates of these firms are assigned to these
firms as their “virtual” restatement announcement dates.
Panel A: Matched Analysis
Year (p) Firms Loans SATT (τp) z-stat
1 91 180 0.5272 8.62
2 87 159 0.3520 6.59
3 73 117 0.3118 4.66
4 58 108 0.2968 3.62
5 42 62 0.3436 3.63
6,7,8 31 66 -0.0105 -0.10
Panel B: Placebo Test
Year (p) Firms Loans SATT (τp) z-stat
1 83 154 0.0488 0.71
2 57 89 0.0012 0.01
3 43 64 0.1675 1.00
4 29 46 0.0370 0.32
5 26 47 -0.0829 -0.62
6, 7, 8 29 62 0.0064 0.05
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The results for the period combining the sixth through the eighth post-restatement
year show no significant differences in loan spreads across misreporting firms and
matched firms. One possible interpretation of these results is that six years or more
is a sufficient amount of time for firms to rebuild their credibility in providing finan-
cial information to capital suppliers.
Panel B of Table 2.5 contains results of a “placebo test” to check the efficacy
of our matching approach. In particular, we want to ensure that using the match-
ing approach with the particular matching variables does not yield similar results
for a random set of firms with random (pseudo) restatement dates. We randomly
select 150 “pseudo treatment” firms from the universe of firms that have both loan
and firm level information available. For each firm, we then randomly assign a
pseudo restatement announcement date between its first and last loan dates. We
then repeat the matching analysis used earlier in this section on this new group of
pseudo-misreporting firms with pseudo-misreporting dates. The results are in Panel
B of Table 2.5. For every pseudo-post-restatement period, the loan spread differences
across treatment and control firms are small in magnitude and statistically insignif-
icant. Thus, the matching approach does not find differences in spreads where there
should be none. The results we find for the actual treatment firms are likely not
driven by the nature of the matching approach itself. We conducted placebo tests
several different ways; all produce results qualitatively similar to those reported.22
In summary, our results from employing matching estimators confirm the findings
from the earlier within-misreporting-sample regression results: Firms that restate
pay a significant premium in their loan spreads for five years. The differences in loan
spreads between misreporting firms and matched firms become statistically insignif-
pre-restatement spreads in the regressions likely stem from the fact that pre-restatement spreads
reflect part of the negative news associated with the restatements.
22These results are available upon request.
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icant in the period six to eight years following a restatement. The results support
the hypothesis that misreporting creates a long-lasting and costly stigma. The next
section uses the matching estimator approach to examine whether the turnover (re-
placement) of various parties that are potentially related to the misreporting shortens
the duration that a firm pays a misreporting premium.
2.4 Effects of Replacements of Potentially-related Parties
We next test the hypothesis that the prompt replacement (or turnover) of parties
who are potentially related to the misreporting lessens the severity or duration of
the post-misreporting premium in loan spreads. Specifically, we identify changes in
CEOs, CFOs, audit committee chairs, and external auditors of misreporting firms
that occur during a 13-month time frame centered on the restatement announce-
ment month. We use this 13-month window since it is the time period during which
top executive turnovers are most likely to be related to the restatement event itself
(Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008).23 The 13-month window also allows us to differ-
entiate firms that made replacements in potentially related parties promptly, rather
than years after the restatement.
In many cases of apparently deliberate financial misreporting, there are no formal
charges or sanctions brought against individuals by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). In these cases, it might be difficult or impossible for capital
23Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a) find a 93% turnover of the responsible parties during the SEC
and Department of Justice enforcement periods for financial misrepresentations. The enforcement
period in their study lasts for 57 months on average after the announcement date. In an earlier
version of this paper, we employed a time-variant definition similar to that method (so that firms
have different values in the turnover indicator throughout the post-restatement period) and found
a high turnover rate for all four of our subjects of interest up to the fourth post-restatement year.
Extending the change-determination window further beyond the restatement date, however, creates
a trade-off between type I and type II errors and complicates interpretation of the results. Given
our research questions, we follow the approach of Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) in focusing on
a period closer to the restatement date.
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suppliers to know exactly who at a firm was responsible for an event of misreporting.
By examining the effects of replacing the four parties on which we focus, we hope to
capture replacements of parties that are the most likely to have been involved in a
misreporting or to have failed to detect it before financial figures were provided to
outsiders. We refer to these parties collectively as potentially-related parties.
2.4.1 Differences in Turnover Ratios
We first compare the frequency of potentially-related party turnovers across mis-
reporting firms and matched firms. The analysis in Table 2.6 compares turnover
rates around the restatement announcement dates across the misreporting and the
matched firms from the matched analysis in the previous section. We use the max-
imal number of observations in each case, so the sample size differs according to
turnover data availability. There is CEO turnover information available for 115 out
of the 180 firms associated with irregular restatements in our sample, 114 for CFOs,
87 for audit committee chairs, and 127 for external auditors.24
Panels A and B of Table 2.6 contain turnover counts and proportions for misre-
porting firms and matched non-misreporting firms, respectively. We note that there
are more firms in the matched group than in the restating group. This is because we
conduct a year-by-year matching method at the loan level. A restating firm can have
loans in each of the five post-restatement years following the announcement date of
the restatement. There can be different matches for each loan that a restating firm
makes, so across the post-restatement periods, a restating firm can have multiple
control firms matched to it.
24We present comparison on turnover rates for restating firms that receive loans during one or more
of the first five post-restatement years. If we include firms that do not receive loans during the first
five post-restatement years, but during years 6,7, or 8 to the comparison, our results do not change
qualitatively.
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Table 2.6
Turnovers Ratios.
This table presents a comparison in the turnover frequencies of CEOs, CFOs, audit committee chairs (ACC), and external auditors (AUD)
between borrowing firms in the treatment and control groups in Panels A and B of Table 2.5, respectively, during the 13-month time frame
surrounding restatement announcement dates. Turnover rates for the treatment group firms are presented in Panel A, while turnover rates
for the control group firms are presented in Panel B. The treatment group firms are those which are associated with irregular financial
restatements, as identified by Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008). Panel C presents results from testing the differences in proportions of
turnover ratios for each of the four parties between the two groups.
Panel A: Restated Firms
CEO CFO ACC AUD
Change 35 30.43% 35 30.70% 15 17.24% 27 21.26%
Total 115 114 87 127
Panel B: Firms in Matched Loans Sample
CEO CFO ACC AUD
Change 37 11.97% 57 18.63% 44 17.81% 23 8.61%
Total 309 306 247 267
Panel C: Difference in Proportions Tests
CEO CFO ACC AUD
Difference 18.46% 12.07% -0.57% 12.65%
z-stat 3.95 2.48 -0.12 3.15
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As shown in Table 2.6, 30% of the restatement firms experience CEO turnovers,
which compares to 12% for the non-restating matched firms. For CFOs, the turnover
proportion is 31% for misreporting firms versus 19% for matched non-misreporting
firms. For external auditors, 21% of misreporting firms and 9% of matched non-
misreporting firms experience a replacement. All three of these differences in turnover
proportions are statistically significant. In contrast to the other three groups of
parties, there is no significant difference in the replacement rates of audit committee
chairs across misreporting and matched firms.
We cannot tell whether the higher percentages of turnover events for misreporting
firms are independent decisions of the respective firms or stem from pressure created
by shifts in control rights to banks. Studies such as Chava and Roberts (2008) and
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) stress the importance of creditor control rights. Roberts
and Sufi (2009) further show that creditor rights are stronger when firms are bank-
dependent because the borrower’s alternative sources of finance are more costly. Our
research questions do not depend on whether firms decided independently to initiate
the turnovers or decided under pressure from banks. We are instead interested in
whether post-restatement premiums in loan spreads differ across firms that do and
do not replace potentially-related parties.
2.4.2 Effects of Replacements on Loan Spreads
We next examine the effects of replacing potentially-related parties on the du-
ration of the misreporting premium in evident loan spreads. The analysis in the
previous section showed that misreporting firms replace potentially-related parties at
higher rates than matched non-misreporting firms. Because the replacement events
themselves may have an effect on loan spreads, we change the matched firm sample
to account for this. Specifically, we continue to use the nearest neighbor matching
estimator approach of Abadie and Imbens (2006), but we add the restriction that a
potential match must have a change in the respective party in the same time period.
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For example, when we seek matches for a misreporting firm that replaced its CEO
in the 13 months centered on its restatement year, we require the non-misreporting
matched firm to have also replaced its CEO in that period. This approach should
control for the direct effects of the replacements themselves on loan spreads, inde-
pendent of whether a firm restated.
Results for how turnovers in CEOs, CFOs, audit committee chairs, and external
auditors can affect the misreporting premium in loan spreads are presented in Pan-
els A, B, C, and D of Table 2.7, respectively. As shown in Panel A, misreporting
firms with prompt CEO replacements pay significant premiums in the loan spreads
compared to matched firms in all five post-restatement years. Although not mono-
tonic, there appears to be a downward trend in the magnitudes of the misreporting
premium over time, but even in year five, misreporting firms that promptly replaced
their CEO around the restatement date pay a 43% premium over matched firms’
loan spreads (p-value = 0.01). Misreporting firms that do not replace their CEO
promptly also pay significantly greater spreads than matched firms in all five post-
restatement years, with a range from 33% to 57% greater. In contrast to the results
for the subsample of misreporting firms that promptly replaced their CEOs, in the
non-CEO-replacement subsample there is no clear trend in the magnitudes of the
misreporting premium over the five post-restatement years.
Results for the sample sorted on CFO replacements are in Panel B of Table 2.7.
Misreporting firms that promptly replace their CFO pay significant misreporting
premiums over matched firms in post-restatement years 1, 2, and 4. By year five,
the misreporting premium for CFO-replacement firms falls to approximately 15%
and is statistically insignificant. We see no obvious explanation for the insignifi-
cantly negative premium in year three followed by the significantly positive premium
in year four. As with the misreporting firms that do not promptly replace their
CEOs, misreporting firms that do not promptly replace their CFO pay significant
misreporting premiums over all five post-restatement years. Also similar to the non-
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Table 2.7
Loan Spreads and Turnovers.
This table shows how the effect of irregular restatements on cost of debt capital can differ within the five post-restatement years when firms experience different turnover outcomes, whether
forced or voluntary, in CEOs, CFOs, audit committee chairs, and external auditors. For each post-restatement year, the bias-corrected nearest neighbor matching estimator of Abadie and
Imbens (2006) is employed separately for the turnover and non-turnover sub-samples of loans at the loan level. The results for CEO, CFO, audit committee chair, and external auditor are
presented in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. The abbreviation “SATT” in the table stands for “sample average treatment effect for the treated.” For the sub-panels labeled “Change,”
treatment loans issued to firms that experience a change in the particular party of that panel are compared control loans issued to firms that also experience the change. Likewise, for the
sub-panels labeled “No Change,” treatment loans issued to firms that do not experience a change in the particular party of that panel are compared control loans issued to firms that also do
not experience the change.
Panel A: CEO Panel B: CFO
Year Firms Loans SATT z-stat Year Firms Loans SATT z-stat
Change 1 28 58 1.1937 14.91 1 21 43 0.8049 6.64
2 19 39 0.7774 5.99 2 18 34 0.3028 3.12
3 16 23 1.2801 7.16 3 13 24 -0.2226 -1.19
4 14 24 0.6166 3.48 4 12 21 0.7028 3.46
5 10 15 0.4311 2.58 5 5 7 0.1496 0.32
No Change 1 35 67 0.4708 5.16 1 42 82 0.4527 5.41
2 39 68 0.4331 5.26 2 39 70 0.5878 5.88
3 32 49 0.3271 2.94 3 35 48 0.2225 2.05
4 30 54 0.3532 2.91 4 32 57 0.4551 4.26
5 18 27 0.5674 2.76 5 23 35 0.5953 4.51
Panel C: Chair of Audit Committee Panel D: External Auditor
Year Firms Loans SATT z-stat Year Firms Loans SATT z-stat
Change 1 9 13 0.6160 2.53 1 12 29 1.3613 11.06
2 7 16 0.2810 1.44 2 15 31 0.4353 3.78
3 5 6 0.0994 0.19 3 13 26 0.0605 0.48
4 3 5 0.1582 0.58 4 10 17 0.2240 0.60
5 3 3 0.2971 0.51 5 6 9 -0.2912 -0.90
No Change 1 36 80 1.1065 16.67 1 50 91 0.5620 5.07
2 39 75 0.5582 7.02 2 55 105 0.5368 8.32
3 30 42 0.3603 3.05 3 41 59 0.2976 2.87
4 29 50 0.4839 4.02 4 28 57 0.4585 3.84
5 17 28 0.4718 3.44 5 13 24 0.1352 0.81
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CEO-replacement firms, there is no clear trend in the magnitudes of the misreporting
premium over the five post-restatement years.
The results for chair of audit committee replacements are in Panel C of Table
2.7. Misreporting firms with prompt replacements of audit committee chairs pay
loan spreads insignificantly different from matched firms in years two through five
following their restatements. We acknowledge that sample sizes for these analyses are
relatively small, but the magnitudes of the points estimates are also relatively small
compared to those in Panels A and B. The subsample of firms that do not promptly
replace their audit committee chairs pay significant premiums over matched firms
in all five post-restatement years, with a range from 36% to 111% greater. With
the caveat about sample sizes, the results suggest that the prompt replacement of an
audit committee chair is effective in reducing the duration of misreporting premiums.
Panel D of Table 2.7 reports the results for the sample sorted on external auditor
replacements. Misreporting firms with external auditor changes pay a premium on
average on their loans relative to benchmark loans during the first two years following
the restatement announcements, but their spreads fall to benchmark firm levels for
years three through five. Misreporting firms that do not replace their external auditor
pay loan spreads significantly greater than matched firms (ranging from 30% to 56%
greater) in post-restatement years one through four; by year five, the misreporting
premium falls to approximately 14% and is statistically insignificant.
In sum, misreporting firms that promptly replace the chairs of their audit com-
mittees and/or their external auditors see their loan spreads fall to benchmark firm
levels within three years of restating. Despite the apparent beneficial effects of replac-
ing such parties, a majority of firms do not promptly replace their audit committee
chairs or external auditors, and pay misreporting premiums in loan spreads for at
least four to five years post restatement. Prompt replacement of CEOs has no clear
mitigation effect, as misreporting firms pay significant misreporting premiums in all
five post-restatement years whether they promptly replace their CEOs or not. The
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results support the hypothesis that firms can reduce the duration of the misreport-
ing stigma by promptly replacing certain parties that are potentially related to the
misreporting, but the mitigation effects occur only for the parties that are directly
related to the auditing function, i.e., audit committee chairs and external auditors.
2.5 Robustness Checks and Discussions
2.5.1 Loan Pricing Premium of New Lenders
We interpret the long-lasting and economically large premiums that misreport-
ing firms pay as a stigma effect stemming from harm to the credibility of a their
future financial reporting and perhaps more generally their veracity. This stigma
increases screening and monitoring cost for banks, which the bank passes along in
the form of higher loan spreads. An alternative explanation of our findings may be
the existence of new lenders. Suppose that a bank that made loans to a misreporting
firm in the pre-restatement period discontinues its lending relationship with the firm
after the bank learns of the misreporting. In seeking post-restatement bank loans,
the misreporting firm is must seek out new lenders who do not have any informa-
tional advantages created by a prior relationship with the firm. If the lack of a prior
relationship increases screening and monitoring costs, the higher post-restatement
spreads that we observe may be a new-bank effect rather than a pure stigma ef-
fect. Although misreporting would still be the source of the higher post-restatement
spreads (because it led to the discontinuation of the firm-bank relationship), the
channel or mechanism at work would be quite different from what we discuss in the
previous sections.
To examine this possibility, we identify the subset of post-restatement loans in
which the bank and borrower had a lending relationship in at least one of the five
years preceding the borrower’s restatement. Because the firms in this subset continue
an existing banking relationships, new-bank effects cannot drive any misreporting
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premiums we observe. More than 80% of the loans in our sample are syndicated.
To more strictly address the possibility of a new bank pricing premium, we use only
the lead of the syndicate as the “representative lender” for each loan. Thus, for
a firm with syndicated loans to be in the subset of firms with continuing banking
relationships, it must have had the same lead bank in the pre and post-restatement
periods. We identify banks using information in the lender-level file of DealScan.
Note that because banks can co-lead a syndicate, there can still be multiple lenders
for a loan even after singling out representative lenders.
Results from the loan spread regression model and matching estimator approach
for the subset of firms with continuing banking relationships are presented as Models
1 and 2 of Table 2.8, respectively. For both approaches, we still observe statistically
and economically significant misreporting premiums out to at least the fifth post-
restatement year. Thus, information effects stemming from new lending relationships
do not drive the results.
2.5.2 Choice to Misreport
By definition, deliberate misreporting is a choice that a firm makes. Although we
confirm in a placebo test in Panel B of Table 2.5 that the observable dimensions in our
models are adequate to capture spread differences in general, we might still be miss-
ing some unobservable difference between misreporting firms and non-misreporting
firms that is unrelated to the fact that one group misreported. As much as possible,
we want to ensure that our findings of long-lasting and economically large misreport-
ing premiums are not driven by such a factor. We attempt to do so by capturing
potential unobservable factors in bank loan pricing using a censored selection model
(Heckman, 1979). The estimation employs full information maximum likelihood for
a misreporting selection model and then second-stage loan spread model. We model
the choice of misreporting by borrowing firms based on firm characteristics observed
just prior to the intentionally misreported accounting periods. The inverse Mills
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Table 2.8
Robustness Checks.
This table presents results from robustness checks of the base findings. Panel A addresses new lender bias. Models 1 and 2 present re-estimations of post-restatement spreads of loans issued
through existing lending relationships using regression and matching estimator approaches, respectively. Both models are estimated on a subsample of loans made to restatement firms that
have lending relationships existing prior to event announcements. New banking relationship is defined as one where the lender (or lead if the loan is syndicated) and the borrower of a loan have
not contracted with each other during the five-year time frame prior to the restatement announcement date. Panel B addresses selection bias and presents results from a censored selection
model estimated through full maximum likelihood. Misreporting propensity is modeled using borrowing firm characteristics just prior to the intentionally misreported accounting periods. The
upper right portion of Panel B shows bias statistics and the result from a likelihood-ratio test between the unrestricted and restricted (where ρ is assumed to be zero) versions of the model.
Regression models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. Definitions and details for each variable can be found in Table 2.1.
Panel A: New Lender Bias Panel B: Selection Bias
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Spread OLS Reg Matching Estimator Spread Bias Statistics
Estimate t-val Sample Estimate t-val Estimate t-val
restatepostn1 0.3443 3.99 Firms Loans SATT z-stat 0.3679 5.12 atanh(ρ) -0.1252 -0.54
restatepost1 0.6835 4.43 40 77 0.7360 6.51 0.5445 4.82 lnσ -0.6552 -16.05
restatepost2 0.3673 2.76 27 40 0.6075 4.94 0.4910 5.63
restatepost3 0.3521 1.97 21 31 0.4930 3.65 0.3155 3.25 ρ -0.1246
restatepost4 0.5224 3.30 13 25 1.4824 16.15 0.3513 3.53 σ 0.5193
restatepost5 0.4490 2.80 5 6 0.8487 3.31 0.2266 2.13 λ -0.0647
restatepost6 0.0202 0.11 0.2615 2.25
lnassets -0.2034 -6.01 -0.2009 -5.61 LR Test
mb -0.0727 -2.27 -0.0681 -3.07 χ2 0.29
leverage 0.5446 3.16 0.6001 4.72 p-val 0.59
profitabilility -2.1695 -3.40 -2.1796 -5.65
tangibility 0.2968 0.75 0.1467 0.56 Misreport Propensity
cfvol 0.0156 1.85 0.0125 0.95 Pre-Misreport Estimate t-val
modzscore -0.0534 -1.32 -0.0219 -0.93 lnassets 0.2858 9.67
lnt -0.0980 -1.89 -0.0791 -2.36 mb -0.0030 -0.13
lnloansize -0.0185 -0.42 -0.0230 -0.77 leverage 0.0178 0.08
perfprice 0.0011 0.02 -0.0225 -0.48 profitabilility 1.1397 2.78
crdtsprd 0.7520 4.70 0.6040 5.23 tangibility -0.4036 -1.30
termsprd 0.0393 0.78 0.0463 1.55 cfvol -0.1154 -2.31
econboom -0.0116 -0.11 -0.0738 -1.06 modzscore -0.0066 -0.69
Loan Type FE Yes Yes
Deal Purpose FE Yes Yes Year FE Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Industry FE Yes
43
ratios (λ) obtained from the probit selection models by all firms should capture the
unobservable aspects that might contribute to the choice of engaging in intentional
misreporting by firms.
In Panel B of Table 2.8, we provide results from the estimations of both the
misreporting propensity equation and the loan spread equation. We also provide
estimates of ρ, the correlation between the error terms of the two equations, and σ,
the standard deviation of the error term of the loan spread model,. Note that ρ is
estimated to be -0.1246, which is statistically insignificant based on the asymptotic
t-statistic of -0.54.25 The magnitude and significance of coefficients from the loan
spread model do not differ qualitatively from our regression results that ignore selec-
tion. We further conduct a likelihood-ratio (LR) test between the the unrestricted
and restricted (where ρ is assumed to be zero) versions of the model. As reported in
the same table, the LR test yields a χ2 value of 0.29, therefore the null hypothesis
of ρ = 0 cannot be rejected.Given the results of these tests, unsurprisingly, we con-
tinue to observe larger spreads being charged on loans issued during at least the five
post-restatement years following the announcements of irregular restatements.
2.5.3 Demand Side Considerations
Our stigma results may also be due to the demand side of private debt. Pun-
galiya (2010), for instance, finds that fraud announcements are followed by credit
rating downgrades. If firms become more bank-dependent once deliberate financial
misreporting activities are revealed, they may lose bargaining power in the process of
bank loan contracting. We make sure that our findings of the financial misreporting
stigma is not due to such demand side considerations.
25Here ρ is estimated indirectly by its inverse hyperbolic tangent atanh(ρ). Testing the null hy-
pothesis of atanh(ρ) = 0 is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis of ρ = 0.
44
Following earlier studies such as Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) and Chava
and Purnanandam (2011), we use the existence of public-debt rating for a firm as
a proxy for its bank-dependence. For the 140 firms in our restricted sample, where
firms have both pre- and post-restatement loans, we see that 65 do not have a public
debt rating before the announcements, and 67 do not have a public debt rating after
the announcements. The difference is due to 7 firms losing their ratings and 5 firms
gaining ratings after announcing their restatements. To ensure that our results are
not due to demand effects, we re-conduct our previous nearest neighbor matching
analyses excluding the 7 firms that lost their rating. In untabulated results, we
continue to observe larger loan spreads being charged on post-restatement loans for
firms that are associated with irregular financial restatements.26
We employ an additional check by examining whether the results in our pre-
vious analysis are due to changes in investment grade status. The threshold be-
tween investment-grade and speculative-grade ratings (junk-rated) often has impor-
tant market implications for borrowing costs of the debt issuer. Investment grade
firms are deemed to have better access to capital in the public-debt market. We
see that, for the 140 firms in our restricted sample, 103 is junk rated before the
restatement announcements, while 117 is junk rated afterwards. The difference of
14 firms is consisted of 16 falling from above investment grade to below around the
announcement dates, and 2 moving the opposite direction. Once again, to enure that
our results are not due to the demand side of private bank debt, we re-estimate our
model excluding the 16 firms that fall below investment grade after their restatement
announcement dates.27 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
26The results in this subsection are similar to those presented in Panel A of Table 2.5. This is
unsurprising, given that the firms excluded take up only a small portion of the original sample.
Results for our demand side analyses are available from the authors upon request.
27Note that excluding only firms experiencing an adverse effect on the demand side biases towards
demand side considerations, as firms that gain public debt ratings or improve in investment grade
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2.5.4 Other Issues
Our measurement for the adverse effect of irregular restatements on firms in the
private debt market is the all-in drawn spreads that are being charged on the loans
issued to those firms. We analyze either (1) a restricted sample, where firms receive
loans both prior to and after their restatement dates, or (2) an unrestricted sample,
where only post-restatement loans are required. Doing so results in the 140 and 185
firms in the final irregular restatements samples, respectively. In each of these two
samples, every firm has at least one loan contracted after announcing its restatement.
One group of firms that hasn’t been examined thus far would be those which only
received loans prior to their restatement dates. 85 firms associated with irregular
restatements fall into this category. That is, for a total of 225 irregular restatement
firms that have loan data reported in DealScan prior to their restatement announce-
ments, nearly 40% of them do not have loan records for their post-event periods.28
We do not include these firm in our main analysis for two reasons. First, we
cannot empirically observe loans made to these firms. We therefore do not have a
direct way to quantify and measure the differences in costs of private debt for these
firms, as compared either to their own pre-restatement levels or to their appropriately
matched non-restatement benchmarks. Second, although our findings are subject to
survivorship bias, such bias likely does not work against our results. There can
be several reasons as to why there are firms that have only pre-restatement loans.
statuses are likely to have more bargaining power in contracting private loans than before. We also
re-conduct the tests in this section by excluding all 12 (18) firms that has a change in their statuses
of public debt rating (investment grade), our results are qualitatively unchanged when doing so.
28The 85 newly mentioned firms in this section, along with the 140 firms that are already in our
restricted sample, make up a total of 225 firms that have loan data reported in DealScan prior to
their restatement announcements. If we look into the full GAO sample, there are a total of 752
firms which have loans specified in the DealScan database prior to their restatement announcements,
meaning that 297 firms do not have loan records during the post-restatement period. This is almost
the same percentage as for the irregularities sample.
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As we discuss, however, such firms are likely to undergo more serious consequences
than simply being charged more on loans when engaging in irregular restatements
(e.g., not able to receive loans or cease to exist). Our larger loan spreads are therefore
effectively capturing a lower bound of the misreporting stigma for firms in the private
debt market.29
While we cannot empirically observe the costs of private debt for these firms,
we are still interested in why they actually no longer receive loans after the event
announcements. By looking into the Compustat universe, we find that 69 of these
85 firms disappear from the data sometime during our sample period. Notably, 56 of
the 69 disappearances happen within their first 5 post-restatement years. For the 56
cases, we look into their CRSP delisting codes. We find that 19 are due to merger-
related activities, while 37 are dropped due to mainly not meeting financial guidelines
for continued listing, delinquent in filing or non-payment of fees, or bankruptcy.30
29One possible counter-argument to the our survivorship explanation is the possibility that firms
foresee bad situations in the near future, and lump their loans during the years prior to announcing
the restatements. If firms accumulate enough cash by doing so, then they might not need to borrow
cash in during the first five post-restatement years. If this is the case, then we should observe firms
without post-restatement loans to have a larger amount of total loan size during the years just prior
to the restatement announcement than do firms with post-restatement loans. We find exactly the
opposite. During the five years just prior to the restatement announcement, the mean total loan size
for firms without post-restatement loans is $700 million, while that for firms with post-restatement
loans is $1.56 billion. During this five-year time period, firms without post-restatement loans receive
on average 3 loans, while firms with post-restatement loans receive on average 3.6 loans. We also
analyze the four-year, three-year, two-year, and one-year pre-restatement period and find similar
trends for each of those time lengths. Firms without post-restatement loans borrow less in terms
of total loan size than firms with post-restatement loans. Although the total number of loans in
those pre-restatement time periods are never significantly different between the two groups, firms
without post-restatement loans were never able to borrow more in terms of loan quantity based on
point estimates. These results are not tabulated, but are available from the authors upon request.
30For firms that do not stay in the sample after restatement announcements due to data availability,
most are associated with non-merger-related reasons. This means that firms do not simply become
more attractive targets after being identified of deliberate reporting misbehavior. Consistent with
our evidence, Amel-Zadeh and Zhang (2010) find that restating firms are significantly less likely
to become takeover targets than matched counterparts. These results indicate that low reporting
quality of firms introduces frictions to the market for corporate control.
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We also provide evidence that our results are not merely a consequence of certain
firm and loan characteristics specific to our sample. Through a comparison of both
the restricted and unrestricted irregularities sample with the universe of DealScan-
Compustat intersection at the loan level, other than having larger firm and loan sizes
for our samples, we see that they are very similar with the universe in terms of all
other characteristics, including loan-to-asset ratios.
Moreover, consistent with extant literature, our loan spread regression models
yield R2 values of around 70%. Along with evidence provided by our validation of
the nearest neighbor matching technique in Panel B of Table 2.5, the observable
dimensions that we employ in our models are adequate to capture loan spread dif-
ferences in general. We therefore assert that our final samples are representative of
the original DealScan-Compustat intersected universe where they came from.31
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) find that firms that misreport their financial state-
ments pay greater spreads on their bank loans following restatement of the misre-
ported figures. We extend work on the effects of misreporting on bank loan spreads
by testing two hypotheses about misreporting stigma effects. We first test the hy-
pothesis that misreporting creates a long-lasting and costly stigma that leads to
misreporting premiums in loan spreads. We find strong support this hypothesis:
misreporting firms pay significant premiums in loan spreads for five years after re-
stating, whether we use misreporting firms’ pre-restatement loans as benchmarks
or similar loans made to matched firms that did not misreport. We next test the
hypothesis that the prompt replacement of parties potentially related to the mis-
31These numbers are not tabulated for space concerns, but are available from the authors upon
request.
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reporting reduces the duration of the stigma. Misreporting firms that promptly
replace the chairs of their audit committees and/or their external auditors see their
loan spreads fall to benchmark firm levels within three years of restating. Despite
the mitigation effects of prompt replacements of audit committee chairs and exter-
nal auditors, a majority of misreporting firms do not promptly replace these parties
and pay significantly greater spreads than matched firms in the five years following
their restatements. Whether or not firms promptly replace their CEOs, they con-
tinue to pay misreporting premiums for at least five years post restatement. Prompt
replacements of CFOs also appear to have weak or non-existent mitigation effects.
Neither the possibility that firms have to find new banks for post-restatement loans
nor self-selection issues related to the decision to misreport appear to explain our
findings.
Our results document a long-lasting and costly stigma of financial misreporting.
To the extent that banks should be able to revise estimates of value and cash flows
relatively quickly, and thus quickly adjust loan spreads to the levels predicted by the
true (restated) financial figures, the long-lasting stigma evident in post-restatement
loan spreads likely reflects higher information costs and uncertainty that banks face in
making loans to firms that misreported long ago. Regaining credibility in reporting
financial information appears to take a long time in the private loan market, but
prompt replacements of certain parties appear to mitigate the duration of the stigma
effect on a firm’s cost of private debt capital. The results have implications for
understanding the effects of misreporting on firm value and on the importance that
banks place on the accuracy of reported (hard) financial information even though
they may also use soft information in their credit screening and monitoring (Petersen,
2004).
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3. CAN SHAREHOLDER-CREDITOR CONFLICTS EXPLAIN WEAK
GOVERNANCE?
In order to explain why shareholders allow weak governance to persist, substantial
costs to improving governance must exist. But what makes improving governance so
costly? In this paper we ask whether one proposed cost – the shareholder-creditor
agency conflict – is large enough to offset the benefits of governance in controlling uses
of cash. To do so, we examine how values of cash holdings react to strong governance,
leverage, and the interaction of the two. As in prior work, we find governance
increases the value of cash holdings to shareholders. We also find that higher leverage
decreases the benefit of strong governance. This is as expected if shareholder-creditor
conflicts make strong governance costly for shareholders. However, the vast majority
of weak governance firms do not use enough leverage to eliminate shareholder gains
from strong governance. Thus, shareholder-creditor conflicts can provide only a small
part of the explanation for why shareholders allow their firms to remain weakly
governed.
Extant research suggests shareholder-creditor conflicts as a plausible barrier to
stronger governance. The residual nature of equitys claim gives shareholders a pref-
erence for risky projects and bondholders a preference for safe projects. John, Litov,
and Yeung (2008) and Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2010) show that shareholder vs
creditor focus affects the riskiness of firm investment policies, while John and John
(1993) show that when such conflicts exist, it is optimal for firms to weaken alignment
between shareholders and managers. Moreover, evidence suggests that creditors do
not benefit from strong governance systems. Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam
(2009) show that bank loans are costlier when the firm has strong governance. The
same result appears in yields on public debt, especially in firms without covenants
(Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2005; John and Litov, 2009; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell,
2005). Finally, Francis, Hasana, John, and Waisman (2010) show that state anti-
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takeover laws appear to protect bondholders, and that bond issues lead to negative
stock returns in takeover-friendly states. These papers imply that solving agency
problems between managers and shareholders deepens the agency problem between
creditors and shareholders, and that these agency conflicts are costly to sharehold-
ers. Our paper adds to this work by examining not only the direction, but also the
magnitudes of these effects.
We look for evidence of shareholder-creditor conflicts in the value of cash holdings.
Cash is a natural place to begin looking at tradeoffs in governance because governance
is intended to control uses of free cash flow. However, as work on shareholder-creditor
conflicts make clear, shareholders and creditors disagree on what makes for a good
use of cash. Moreover, other choices over which shareholders and managers might
disagree, such as dividends or leverage, are controlled by covenants. Managers can
decide on uses of cash with relative freedom, however. Therefore, if shareholder-
creditor conflicts arise, the effects are likely largest in uses of cash.
We apply the methodology of Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007) to estimate the value of cash to shareholders. The basic model
of Faulkender and Wang (2006) regresses stock returns on changes in cash. Vari-
ables that change the value of cash show up as interactions with changes in cash.
For example, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009)
interact governance variables with changes in cash holdings to show that governance
increases the value of cash holdings on average. We add an additional three-way
interaction between governance and leverage to capture the fact that shareholder-
creditor conflicts reduce the benefits of governance as leverage increases.
We confirm the strong benefits of governance in controlling uses of cash found
by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) using several measures. For example, in an
unlevered firm with five or six of the provisions identified by Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2009) as indicative of bad governance, $1 of cash is worth approximately
$1.50. In an unlevered firm with zero of those provisions, $1 of cash is worth an
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additional $1.38. As market leverage increases from zero to one hundred percent,
the value of cash stays relatively constant in a firm with five or six entrenching
provisions. As market leverage increases from zero to one hundred percent, the value
of cash falls by $2.08 for a firm with zero entrenching provisions. Thus, the net
benefit of governance as a function of leverage is 1.38 − 2.08 × Leverage. This is
consistent with the existence of shareholder-creditor conflicts, as leverage reduces the
net benefit of stronger governance.32 However, when we calculate this net benefit
for those firm-years with five or six entrenching provisions, fewer than ten percent
see a zero or negative net benefit of governance. In fact, almost eighty-five percent
of these firm-years would gain more than $0.25 of value for each dollar of cash held.
Even after accounting for shareholder-creditor conflicts, strong governance improves
value in the vast majority of firms.
Other governance measures paint a picture similar to that of the Bebchuk, Co-
hen, and Ferrell (2009) index. Moving from the bottom quintile of pension ownership
to the top quintile increases the value of cash in nearly 70% of firm-years. Some-
what surprisingly, moving from the bottom quintile to the second highest quintile of
pension ownership increases the value of cash in almost 85% of firms, with nearly
65% gaining $0.25 per dollar of cash held. Moving from the bottom quintile of to-
tal institutional ownership to the top quintile increases the value of cash in 80% of
firm-years. Increasing from low institutional ownership increases the value of cash
by $0.25 per dollar held for more that 65% of low institutional ownership firm years.
Once again, it appears that even in the presence of shareholder-creditor conflicts,
shareholders gain substantial value from strong governance.
32Of course, this is also consistent with the idea that leverage acts as a substitute mechanism for
controlling free cash flows. Our estimate therefore provides an upper bound on the severity of
shareholder-creditor conflicts.
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We check for robustness of results in several ways. First, we show that non-
linearity in leverage does not affect our conclusions. Using different transformations
of leverage or different measures of leverage produces very similar estimates. Second,
we show that endogenous choices of governance do not drive the results. In fact,
the results using a two-stage least-squares show greater governance benefits than our
simple OLS results. Finally, we show that broadening our analysis to non-cash assets
does not substantively change our conclusions.
Finally, we extend our analysis to separate out movements toward optimal cash
targets and movements away from optimal cash targets. The net benefits of gov-
ernance in controlling excess cash appear similar in magnitude to the net benefits
using total cash. The net benefits of governance in controlling optimal cash are much
smaller. This suggests our basic tests are picking up values of cash that managers
could choose to waste. Moreover, the negative impact of leverage on the benefit
of governance also appears most concentrated in excess changes in cash. This is
important, as it is the cash over which managers have discretion that should gen-
erate conflicts between shareholders and creditors, not the cash required for simply
running the firm.
Overall, we show the magnitudes of these costs do not appear large enough for
shareholders to actually prefer weak governance to strong. In fact, the magnitudes
of shareholder-creditor conflicts are too small to even make most shareholders rea-
sonably indifferent between weak and strong governance. If shareholders find weak
governance better than strong governance–and we know they must, since we ob-
serve weak governance–costs other than shareholder-creditor conflicts must prevent
strengthening governance.
One additional note is in order. We do not compare shareholder gains to creditor
losses, so we cannot take a side in the debate about whether weak governance is
firm value-maximizing. Shareholder-creditor conflicts are clearly important for un-
derstanding firms’ use of covenants (see, for example, Chava, Kumar, and Warga,
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2009, and banks and bondholders clearly dislike stronger governance and the in-
creased risk it implies. Instead, our point is that shareholders control the strength of
governance, and shareholders appear to gain from strong governance. Thus, the fact
that weak governance destroys value even after accounting for leverage policy implies
some force unrelated to leverage prevents shareholders from improving governance.
While our results argue against shareholder-creditor conflicts as a major source of
costs of strong governance systems, what costs prevent shareholders from fixing weak
governance remains an important question for future research.
Section 3.1 discusses our additions to the empirical work of Faulkender and Wang
(2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). Section 3.2 provides the results of
our main tests. Section 3.3 presents evidence in excess and optimal cash changes.
Section 3.4 comments on the economic significance of our findings. Section 3.5 shows
results of several auxiliary tests to support the robustness of our findings. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.1 Research Design
3.1.1 Empirical Model
We use a specification in the spirit of Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) to estimate the value of cash.33 We augment the Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) specification in one of the following two ways for each test:
ARit = βit
∆Cit
Mit−1
+ ZitB+ εit (3.1)
βit = v + vGGit + vLLit−1 + vGLGitLit−1 (3.2)
33They interpret their methodology as a long-run event study, and as such focus on surprises in
cash. However, papers utilizing q-theory to explain returns, for example Liu, Whited, and Zhang
(2009), show that assets show up in returns when managers invest optimally. Papers such as Gomes,
Yaron, and Zhang (2006) and Whited and Wu (2006) further show that characteristics that relax
financial constraints, as cash flows must, matter for returns, as well.
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βit = v +
∑
j
vG|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + vLLit−1 +
∑
j
vGL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1, (3.3)
where the subscript indicates firm i at time t. We group firm years according to the
strength of their governance. We use these groups in two ways. First, in equation 3.2
we treat the group number as a continuous measure of governance.34 One advantage
of 3.2 is that it is relatively easy to understand. The coefficient captures the average
benefit of improving governance by increasing governance into the next group. More
importantly, however, we cannot use the indicator variable specification in our later
two-stage least-squares tests as we do not have enough instruments to identify all of
the indicator variables. In equation 3.3, we use indicator variables, denoted I[ · ], to
assign firms to groups based on the strength of their governance. The advantage of
3.3 is that it captures non-linearity, and even non-monotonicity, in the governance
variables.
The value of cash, β, depends on several firm characteristics in our specifica-
tion. The first parameter, v measures the average value of cash in an unlevered,
weak-governance firm. The second set of parameters, vG or vG|g=j provide esti-
mates of the difference between unlevered, stronger governance firms and unlevered,
weak-governance firms. We proxy for stronger governance using a series of indicator
variables, in the spirit of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The third parameter,
vL, estimates the effect of leverage on the value of cash in weak-governance firms,
as in Faulkender and Wang (2006). The fourth set of parameters, vGL or vGL|g=j,
represents our addition. If shareholder-creditor conflicts increase with leverage, then
the net benefit of governance will fall as leverage increases. This implies vGL < 0 is
a necessary condition for the existence of costs to shareholder-creditor conflicts.
34For the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index, the group number is effectively
the raw variable. Raw institutional ownership measures are measured with error, especially at ex-
treme institutional ownership levels. Our use of group number pulls extreme observations together,
mitigating, but not eliminating, this problem. See Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick
(2006) for more analysis on ownership, and especially high ownership.
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Notice that 3.2 also provides a way to estimate the value of governance for a
given firm. The base value of governance were the firm unlevered is vG. Leverage
reduces the benefit of governance at a rate vGL. Thus, vG +GL ×Lit−1 estimates the
net benefit of strong governance for a given firm year. If that number is positive,
strong governance firms have higher values of cash even accounting for leverage. If
that number is negative, strong governance firms have lower values of cash at the
firm’s leverage ratio. Our tests focus mainly on the distribution of this estimated
net benefit of governance.
By attributing the entire effect of leverage to shareholder-creditor conflicts, we
can estimate a “best-case scenario” for the ability of shareholder-creditor conflicts
to explain weak governance choices. Even if the value of governance in controlling
uses of cash falls for innocuous reasons–for example, if leverage acts as a substitute
for strong governance in controlling free cash flows–we will count it as evidence of
a shareholder-creditor conflict. Thus, our calculations likely overestimate the true
costs of shareholder-creditor conflicts.
The dependent variable in 3.1, ARit, is the firm’s stock return over the fiscal
year adjusted by the return on a matched portfolio. Our main question is whether
shareholder-creditor conflicts can explain why weakly governed firms choose to re-
main weakly governed. Because shareholders determine the strength of governance,
the shareholder focus underlying our choice of stock returns is the correct one. Notice
that we do not claim strong governance is optimal in a broad sense. Shareholder-
creditor conflicts might mean that weak governance maximizes firm value. However,
if strong governance increases shareholder value, shareholders prefer strong gover-
nance to weak. Our main analysis uses the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997) and Wermers (2004) 125 size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristic-
56
based benchmarks.35 We also follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007), who use size and book to market portfolios as benchmarks,
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009), who use Fama-French industries as benchmarks, as
well as raw simple raw returns.36 Our results are similar to those reported here using
any of those return specifications.
Aside from our governance measures, the main explanatory variables of inter-
est are ∆Cit, the change in cash, and Lit−1, the lagged market leverage ratio. We
find consistent results if we replace the lagged market leverage ratio with the con-
temporaneous leverage ratio, as in Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007), or if we use the Welch (2004) and Iliev and Welch (2010) active
financing approach to calculate the contemporaneous leverage ratio not attributable
to current returns. The matrix Zit includes the other explanatory variables used
by Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007): the change
in cash interacted with a financial constraint measure, lagged cash holdings, lagged
cash holdings interacted with the change in cash, the change in earnings, change
in non-cash assets, change in R&D, the change in interest expense, change in divi-
dends, net financing, leverage, and the governance indicators. We also include year
and firm fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm. We scale all explanatory
variables by the lagged market value of equity with the exception of leverage and
the governance variables. Thus, the coefficient on each is the value of a $1 change
to shareholders. Please see Table 3.1 for more detailed variable descriptions. All
variables are measured in Year 2005 dollars using the CPI.
35Please see those papers for details on the construction of the portfolios. The DGTW benchmarks
and portfolio assignments are available via
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
36Size and book-to-market portfolio breakpoints and returns, as well as industry definitions and
returns, come from Ken French’s website at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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Table 3.1
Variable Definitions for Section 3.
This table presents definitions of variables used in Section 3, “Can Shareholder-creditor Conflicts Explain Weak Governance? Evidence from the Value of Cash
Holdings.”
Dependent Variables
ARit DGTW-125 Benchmark-adjusted return over fiscal year t (CRSP and Russ Wermers)
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm
Governance Variables
BCF Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index (RiskMetrics)
BCF0 Initial value of the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index for each firm (RiskMetrics)
Pension Total percent ownership by pensions, quarter prior to fiscal-year end (Thomson-Reuters 13-F)
Block Total percent ownership by institutions with 5% of shares, quarter prior to fiscal-year end (Thomson-Reuters 13-F)
Institutions Total percent ownership by institutions, quarter prior to fiscal-year end (Thomson-Reuters 13-F)
Other Controls
Mit PRCC Fit × CSHOit (Compustat)
∆Cit Change in CHE from year t − 1 to t (Compustat)
Lit Leverage
DLTTit+DLCit
DLTTit+DLCit+Mit
(Compustat)
MLit Mechanical Leverage
DLTTit−1+DLCit−1
DLTTit−1+DLCit−1+Mit−1(1+Rit)
(Compustat and CRSP)
NMLit Non-Mechanical Leverage Lit−1 + [(Lit − Lit−1)− (MLit − Lit−1)]
∆Eit Change in IB +XINT + TXDI + ITCI from year t− 1 to t (Compustat)
∆NAit Change in AT − CHE from year t − 1 to t (Compustat)
∆RDit Change in max{XRD, 0} from year t− 1 to t (Compustat)
∆XINTit Change in XINT from year t− 1 to t (Compustat)
∆DVCit Change in DVC from year t − 1 to t (Compustat)
Payerit Indicator variable for DV C > 0 in year t (Compustat)
Cit−1 CHE at year t− 1 (Compustat)
NFit SSTK − PRSTKC +DLTIS −DLTR (Compustat)
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3.1.2 Governance Measures
We require governance systems that help control waste of free cash flows. Any
mechanism, internal or external, that prevents waste of cash is a candidate. We
measure external governance using the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) index
(BCF).37 Following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), we treat this index as miss-
ing for dual-class firms. Similar to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), we also use
the initial value of the BCF measure for each firm as an additional variable. These
measures come from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC). We also use measures of internal
governance. We use the percent ownership by activist public pensions (Pension) as
our first internal governance measure. Our list of public pensions follows Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007).38 Pensions are a particularly interesting form of gover-
nance, as prior studies show that pensions affect firms charter provisions and thus
can improve governance systems in the future (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Guercio and
Hawkins, 1999; Smith, 1996). We also use the percent of shares held by institutional
blockholders (Block) following Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007). Anticipating results, we find strong evidence of non-monotonicity in
the pension measure, as well as extremely small effects of blockholdings on the value
of cash. Based on the results of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), who show that
even outside directors appear to become entrenched when ownership passes the 5%
level, and McConnell and Servaes (1990), who show that total institutional ownership
increases firm value while blockholdings do not, we also consider total institutional
ownership (Institutions) as an alternative measure of institutional oversight.
37For completeness, we have also conducted our tests using the O-Index, which is the set of pro-
visions from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) not included in the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2009) index. We find no evidence that the O-Index increases the value of cash holdings, nor does
it seem to affect shareholder-creditor conflicts. This non-result is consistent with those reported in
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Thus, we do not report the results of that measure.
38See Table 1 on page 604 of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
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We use the same breakpoints for the BCF index as Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2009): {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 − 6}. We use annual quintiles for the institutional owner-
ship variables because those variables are continuous but notoriously error-ridden.
Though continuous, approximately 25% of our observations have zero pension own-
ership, while approximately 30% of our observations have zero blockholdings. Thus,
very few observations account for the second quintile of these measures. We have
explored alternative breakpoints, such as quartiles or terciles, and find that our in-
ferences do not depend on the breakpoints chosen for these measures.
3.1.3 Sample
Our sample firms are those in the intersection of CRSP and Compustat. We
augment that data with information from the Thomson-Reuters 13-F database and
RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC). Our main sample begins in 1990 and ends in 2007
because those are the start and end years of the RiskMetrics data.39 As in prior work,
we remove financial firms and utilities, as these firms face regulatory burdens that
distort leverage policies. We work with share codes 10 and 11 only, which restricts
the sample to U.S. common stocks. Finally, we remove any firms with a fiscal year
not covering 12 months and firms for which the full fiscal year of monthly returns are
not available in CRSP. In all analysis, we trim the dependent variable and the non-
governance independent variables in equation 3.1 at the top and bottom percentiles
by year. Because most of these variables represent changes in an accounting item
relative to the market value of the firm, large positive and negative changes likely
represent coding errors.
39Beginning with its 2007 file, RiskMetrics has revised its data collection. Several of the variables
necessary for the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) are no longer collected. In addition, the state
laws required for the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) are also no longer available through that
source.
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3.2 Main Results
We report estimates of the value of cash in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. For our reported
results, we focus on the lagged market leverage ratio. We see very similar results using
several alternative measures, including (1) contemporaneous market leverage, (2)
non-mechanical leverage ratio from Welch (2004), and (3) interest expense scaled by
lagged market equity.40 We include five governance variables: The contemporaneous
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index (BCF ), each firm’s initial
entrenchment index value (BCF0), public pension ownership (pension), institutional
blockholder ownership (block), and total institutional ownership (institutions). Panel
A in Table 3.2 and the entire Table 3.3 show the main coefficients of interest. In
Table 3.2, the coefficients labeled vG provide the value of increasing one governance
group regardless of starting point, while the coefficients labeled vGL estimate the
rate at which leverage reduces the value of stronger governance. In Table 3.3, the
coefficients labeled vG|G=j provide the value of moving from the weakest governance
group to stronger governance group j for an unlevered firm. The coefficients labeled
vGL|G=j show how leverage reduces the value of stronger governance.
40The contemporaneous market leverage is arguably a better measure for our tests than lagged
market leverage because leverage going forward should be more important to shareholders valuing
cash holdings than past leverage. However, this measure suffers from the fact that Welch (2004)
shows substantial variation in market leverage ratios follow mechanically from stock returns. The
non-mechanical leverage ratio from Welch (2004) is also likely a better measure than lagged leverage
for our purposes. While it does not get the complete picture of a firm’s leverage ratio, it does
provide a measure closer to current leverage ratios by incorporating active financing choices. In the
regression of Fama and French (1998)–which is closely related to the Faulkender and Wang (2006)
regression–interest expense is used as a leverage measure. We therefore use interest expense scaled
by lagged market equity as a third alternative measure of leverage ratio. This measure once again
allows some current financing decisions into leverage without mechanically relating to returns. The
measure also captures elements of leverage that can be missing from the stated book value of long-
term debt. In our main tests, although we choose the conservative, likely noisy, measure of lagged
market leverage, inferences about the fraction of firms with potential gains from governance, and
the value of those gains, are consistent across all leverage measures. These results are available
upon request.
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Table 3.2
Leverage Reduces the Net Benefits of Governance.
We run the following regression for groups of firms based on one of five measures of governance:
ARit = βit
∆Cit
Mit−1
+ ZitB+ εit
βit = v + vGGit + vLLit−1 + vGLGitLit−1,
where Git represents a measure of governance. We use group numbers to measure governance rather than raw scores because ownership
measures are measured with significant error. For the BCF and BCF0 groups, we follow the breakpoints of Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2009); we define ownership groups according to annual quintiles. The dependent variable is a size, book-to-market, and
momentum adjusted fiscal-year return (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 2004). Panel A presents estimates
of coefficients used to estimate the net benefits of governance. The coefficient vG provides the average estimated benefit of improving
by one governance group for an unlevered firm. The coefficient vGL provides an average rate at which leverage reduces the benefits
of improved governance across all governance groups. Panel B provides estimates of control variables, including the base value of cash
and the interaction between cash and leverage in weakly governed firms. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects, which we
suppress for space. p-values clustered by firm appear in brackets. Please see Table 3.1 for variable definitions.
Panel A: Coefficients used in calculating the net benefits of improved governance
Coefficient BCF BCF0 Pension Block Institutions
vG 0.2331 0.1687 0.1484 0.0213 0.1580
[0.007] [0.089] [0.000] [0.536] [0.000]
vGL -0.2744 -0.2185 -0.3480 -0.1118 -0.3571
[0.173] [0.322] [0.002] [0.259] [0.002]
Panel B: Control variable coefficient estimates
Variable BCF BCF0 Pension Block Institutions
∆Cit/Mit−1 1.5604 1.7667 2.0121 2.1886 1.9266
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
∆Cit/Mit−1 × Lit−1 -0.5530 -0.8415 -0.8611 -1.1131 -0.7592
[0.379] [0.263] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
∆Cit/Mit−1 × Payerit -0.5191 -0.5366 -0.4934 -0.4728 -0.4717
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lit−1 0.5207 0.5241 0.5645 0.5676 0.6073
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Payerit -0.0941 -0.0898 -0.0949 -0.0942 -0.0956
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
∆NAit/Mit−1 0.3336 0.3469 0.4232 0.4212 0.4152
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
∆Eit/Mit−1 0.4805 0.4906 0.5340 0.5318 0.5348
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
∆RDit/Mit−1 0.6166 0.6416 0.4038 0.4136 0.3588
[0.221] [0.232] [0.152] [0.142] [0.201]
∆XINTit/Mit−1 -2.6274 -2.8182 -3.0160 -2.9845 -2.9851
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
∆DVCit/Mit−1 5.1381 4.5512 4.8925 4.7202 4.9858
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
NFit/Mit−1 -0.2616 -0.2564 -0.1329 -0.1311 -0.1335
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cit−1/Mit−1 0.8831 0.8728 0.9016 0.9062 0.9138
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
∆Cit/Mit−1 × Cit−1/Mit−1 -0.8075 -0.7106 -0.8073 -0.8567 -0.7599
[0.003] [0.021] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,103 2,023 6,069 6,069 6,069
Firms 15,859 14,893 45,989 45,989 45,989
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Table 3.3
Net Benefits of Governance: Governance Quintile Indicators.
We run the following regression for groups of firms based on one of five measures of governance:
ARit = βit
∆Cit
Mit−1
+ ZitB+ εit
βit = v +
∑
j
vG|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + vLLit−1 +
∑
j
vGL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1,
where I[ · ] takes a value of one when its argument is true, and Git represents a measure of governance. BCF and
BCF0 groups are defined according to the breakpoints in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009); ownership groups are
defined according to annual quintiles. The dependent variable is a size, book-to-market, and momentum adjusted
fiscal-year return (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 2004). The table presents estimates of
coefficients used to estimate the net benefits of governance. The coefficient vG|G=j provides the estimated benefit
of improving from the weakest governance group to the jth governance group for an unlevered firm. The coefficient
vGL|G=j provides an estimate of the rate at which leverage reduces the net benefits of governance for the j
th
governance group. Estimates of control variables, including the base value of cash and the interaction between cash
and leverage in weakly governed firms, are similar to those reported in Table 3.2 and are therefore omitted. All
regressions include firm and year fixed effects, which we suppress for space. p-values clustered by firm appear in
brackets. Please see Table 3.1 for variable definitions.
Coefficient BCF BCF0 Pension Block Institutions
vG|G=2 0.1805 0.5249 0.0659 0.1922 -0.1522
[0.745] [0.465] [0.669] [0.374] [0.304]
vG|G=3 0.6224 0.5315 0.5561 0.1972 0.1745
[0.240] [0.430] [0.001] [0.233] [0.270]
vG|G=4 0.8835 0.7629 0.5923 0.1126 0.2525
[0.095] [0.220] [0.001] [0.445] [0.181]
vG|G=5 0.7222 0.8156 0.3879 0.0676 0.6450
[0.197] [0.195] [0.019] [0.653] [0.001]
vG|G=6 1.3766 1.1333 - - -
[0.020] [0.092] - - -
vGL|G=2 -1.1918 -0.5310 0.2850 -0.0143 0.2998
[0.290] [0.728] [0.517] [0.982] [0.471]
vGL|G=3 -1.5979 -1.2814 -1.0101 -0.1646 -0.3965
[0.103] [0.332] [0.023] [0.733] [0.408]
vGL|G=4 -2.1997 -0.6582 -1.1246 -0.3888 -0.5537
[0.026] [0.607] [0.025] [0.339] [0.279]
vGL|G=5 -1.6035 -1.7458 -1.1436 -0.3705 -1.5446
[0.111] [0.161] [0.022] [0.392] [0.003]
vGL|G=6 -2.0779 -1.4157 - - -
[0.080] [0.298] - - -
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In Panel A of Table 3.2, we see little evidence that blockholders have any effect on
values of cash, a pattern repeated throughout our tests.41 The results for the other
four measures, however, suggest that improving from a starting governance group to
the next group is worth between $0.15 and $0.23. The gain to stronger governance
is not uniform, however, as leverage generally decreases the gains from governance.42
Because the benefit falls, there is some leverage ratio at which the difference between
the value of cash in strong and weak governance firms is zero. For example, the
BCF measure suggests that at a leverage ratio of 85%, the value of governance falls
to zero. This is an inordinately high leverage ratio. The pension holdings and total
institutional holdings measures suggest that the value of governance falls to zero at
a leverage ratio of 42% to 44%. Though much more reasonable, these leverage ratios
are still unusually high, as we now show.
In Panel B of Table 3.2, we present results for the control variables. One impor-
tant difference between our results and those seen in Faulkender and Wang (2006)
is the sign of leverage. In our tests, leverage has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on returns, whereas Faulkender and Wang (2006) see a negative and
statistically significant effect. The difference is one of timing. When we use con-
41McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide consistent results, showing that blockholders do not have
an effect on firm value while total institutional ownership does.
42The BCF measure has a negative but insignificant coefficient in the levels regression. There
are three important things to note about this result. First, the lack of significant result implies
that leverage does not decrease the value of governance. This means that leverage cannot possibly
explain why firms choose weak governance, and, therefore, implies that shareholder-creditor conflicts
cannot explain why firms choose weak governance. By ignoring the insignificance of this coefficient,
we are biasing in favor of shareholder-creditor conflicts. Second, when we estimate the value of
governance using a dummy variable for zero leverage firms, the value of strong governance using
the BCF measure appears negative for unlevered firms. Note that this evidence is also strongly
inconsistent with shareholder-creditor conflicts driving the value of governance, as zero leverage
firms should have no shareholder-creditor conflicts. Third, the dummy variable results do suggest
that, at the highest levels of the BCF index, there is a negative relationship between the leverage
and the value of governance. For these three reasons, we continue with the analysis as though the
coefficient were statistically significant.
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temporaneous leverage ratios, as in Faulkender and Wang (2006), we see a negative
relationship. As Welch (2004) argues, leverage and returns have a mechanical rela-
tionship (firms with high returns will tend to have low leverage).
For ease of interpretation, we present results graphically. For each measure, we
use the estimates of Table 3.2 to estimate the difference between the value of cash
in stronger and weaker governance firms as
∆̂V G = vG + vGL × Lit−1, (3.4)
which measures the net benefit of strong governance in controlling uses of cash.43
We estimate this value using firm years in the weakest governance group.44
We present the empirical cumulative densities of the net benefit of governance
in Figure 3.1. The blockholder measure, as noted before, shows no effect either
on its own or interacted with leverage. We start with this measure to illustrate
features of our figures. First, stronger blockholder firms do not see higher values
of cash even when unlevered. This lack of value for low leverage firms means that
nearly one hundred percent of firm years have a zero or negative net benefit of
governance. Second, blockholders and leverage do not interact significantly. The
lack of interaction results in a curve that is extremely steep, indicating that leverage
does not explain differences in the net benefits of governance. If shareholder-creditor
conflicts explain weak governance choices, we expect to see two features in the figure.
First we expect the majority of weakly governed firm years to exhibit a negative net
benefit of governance, as seen in the blockholder measure. Second, we expect a
sloped curve, indicating that leverage affects the net benefit of governance. It is in
43This is akin to a treatment effect estimate where the treatment effect of moving from weak to
strong governance depends on leverage.
44The estimates suggest that the benefit of strong governance falls with leverage. Because weak
governance firms have higher leverage than strong governance firms (Francis, Hasana, John, and
Waisman, 2010), using strong governance firms and their lower leverage ratios will tend to overstate
the value of governance. Therefore, we use only weak governance firms.
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Fig. 3.1. Raw Governance Levels.
For each firm year in the weakest governance group, we calculate the net benefit of
increasing governance from a lower group to a higher group as vG + vGL × Lit−1.
Estimates of vG and vGL appear in Panel A of Table 3.2. The x-axis shows different
net benefits of governance, while the y-axis represents the cumulative percent of
weakly governed at or below that net benefit. For the BCF measure, decreases
indicate stronger governance, while for the ownership measures, increases generally
indicate stronger governance.
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this second requirement that our blockholder measure fails to support shareholder-
creditor conflicts as a major determinant of weak governance choices.
Other measures of governance also do not provide much evidence for shareholder-
creditor conflicts as a major explanation of weak governance choices. The BCF
measure, for example, shows a relatively flat curve, indicating that variability in the
net benefits of governance. However, no firms in our weak governance sample have
a leverage ratio high enough to cause a negative value of governance. This result
suggests that all of our weak governance firms could gain by improving governance.
The magnitudes are also very large. Half of our weak governance firms stand to gain
over $0.17 per dollar of cash held by reducing their entrenching provisions to four
instead of five or six. Pensions and total institutional holdings tell a similar story.
The net benefit of governance appears positive for slightly more than 80% of our
weak pension and institutional holdings firms, while net benefits of strong governance
exceed $0.10 to $0.12 per dollar held for half of our weak pension and institutional
holdings firms. These results do not support shareholder-creditor conflicts–or any
forces related to leverage, for that matter–as a major explanation for why firms
choose weak governance.
In Table 3.3, we report results of increasing from the weakest governance group
to each of the stronger governance groups.45 As before, the relationship between
the BCF index and the value of cash holdings is very strong. For unlevered firms,
the difference between the value of cash in strong and weak governance firms exceeds
$1.30 per dollar held. This number exceeds that in Table 3.2 by a large amount. The
reason is that Table 3.2 estimates a one group increase, while Table 3.3 estimates a
five group improvement in governance. Moreover, the dummy variable specification
45Estimates of control variables, including the base value of cash and the interaction between cash
and leverage in weakly governed firms, are similar to those reported in Table 3.2 and are therefore
omitted.
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shows extreme nonlinearity in the BCF measure, which sheds some light on why
the BCF measure does not show strong evidence of a negative relationship between
leverage and net benefits of strong governance. The pension and institutions mea-
sures both show higher value in the highest ownership quintile than in the lowest
ownership quintile. Note, however, that the maximum value of cash occurs in the
second highest quintile for pension holdings. One possible explanation is that strong
institutions can harm minority shareholders.46 Romano (1993) suggests that public
pension fund managers may succumb to political pressures. At low levels of own-
ership, only activities that create value for all shareholders can pass. As ownership
increases, however, public pensions and other institutions may be able to influence
firms in ways that help the fund, but hurt shareholders in general.47 Because of the
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that the highest public pension owner-
ship does not always lead to higher values of cash, we take the second highest quintile
as a measure of strong governance for the pension ownership measure. Finally, the
value of blockholdings is once again extremely small and not statistically significant.
To evaluate magnitudes, we again turn to figures. In Figure 3.2, we use the
estimates from in Table 3.3 to estimate the net benefit of strong governance for
those firm years with the weakest governance group according to each measure.
The x-axis provides a range of net benefits of governance, while the y-axis shows
how many weakly governed firms have net benefits below that point. The results
provide little support for shareholder-creditor conflicts as a major determinant of
why firms choose weak governance. Consider Panel A of Figure 3.2. The solid red
46Pound (1988) shows that banks and insurance companies often side with management in proxy
contests, so increasing their shares may partially drive the results. However, pension holdings also
exhibit an inverted-U shaped pattern, albeit at higher levels, so this does not completely explain
the inverted-U.
47Romano (1993) notes recommendations by a New York State task force that public pensions
account for local concerns (state economy and employment) during hostile takeovers. As Romano
notes, this creates a wedge between the interests of pensions and the interests of other shareholders.
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Fig. 3.2. Governance Level Indicators.
We calculate the net benefit of improving governance from the weakest group to
group j as vG|G=j + vGL|G=j×Lit−1 for each weakly governed firm year. Estimates of
vG|G=j and vGL|G=j appear in Panel A of Table 3.3. The x-axis shows different net
benefits of governance, while the y-axis represents the cumulative percent of weakly
governed at or below that net benefit. For the BCF measure, decreases indicate
stronger governance, while for the ownership measures, increases generally indicate
stronger governance.
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line shows that almost no firms have a positive value of moving from the weakest
governance group to the second weakest governance group. The figure also suggests
that leverage affects the net benefit of strong governance. Thus, one can conclude
that shareholder-creditor conflicts explain why weak governance firms do not improve
governance into the second weakest group. However, the three intermediate values
of the BCF measure tell a very different story. Only 20% of weak governance firms
have leverage ratios high enough that our net benefit of strong governance falls below
zero. The remaining 80% of weak governance firms have positive net benefits of strong
governance. Almost 90% of weakly governed firms have positive net benefits of strong
governance. The magnitudes are large, as well. Our estimates imply an $0.80 per
dollar of cash difference between strong and weak BCF firms for the median weak
governance firm.
The pension and total institutional holdings measures tell similar stories in Figure
3.2. For 65% of low pension ownership leverage ratios, the value of cash under strong
governance exceeds the value of cash under weak. As noted before, the value of
pension holdings is highest for the intermediate holding measures. More than 80%
of low pension ownership leverage ratios see a higher value of cash under strong
governance than weak. For the median leverage ratio, the difference between the
value of cash in strong and weak governance firms is $0.40 per dollar of cash held. The
total institutional ownership measure, for which only the highest levels of ownership
increase the value of cash, tells a similar story. For 80% low ownership leverage
ratios, the value of cash is higher under strong governance than weak. At the median
leverage ratio for low institutional ownership firms, the difference between the value
of cash in strong governance firms and weak governance firms is $0.40 per dollar
of cash. The blockholder measure, which shows no value of governance nor any
interactive relationship between governance and leverage, also shows most firms’ net
benefit of governance near zero. The basic results tell a consistent story; higher
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leverage reduces the net benefit of strong governance, but leverage ratios are not
high enough for shareholder-creditor conflicts to explain weak governance choices.
Overall, the main results suggest the following: Leverage does appear to decrease
the net benefits of governance. This is consistent with shareholder-creditor conflicts,
which provide one rationale for the negative effect of leverage. However, the leverage
ratios of weak governance firms are not nearly high enough to offset the value of
governance to shareholders completely. Therefore, we can conclude two important
things. First, there must be some cost that prevents shareholders from improving
governance. Second, that cost is unrelated to leverage, so things like shareholder-
creditor conflicts cannot explain why shareholders allow weak governance to persist.
This is not to say that shareholder-creditor conflicts are not important for other
reasons, but rather that these conflicts are too small quantitatively to explain why
firms choose weak governance.
3.3 Excess and Optimal Changes in Cash
Citing concern that it is excess cash that managers waste, Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) examine firms with positive excess cash holdings separately. We follow
their lead, applying the model of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) to
estimate a firm’s optimal cash holding. We do not simply replace changes in cash
with changes in excess cash however. As Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) note,
changes in excess cash represent both active changes in cash holdings and changes
in target.
A firm’s optimal change in cash should bring the cash holding in line with the
target, so that ∆Cit = C
∗
it−Cit−1 if the change in cash is optimal. If the change in cash
is sub-optimal, then the excess cash raised is Cit−C
∗
it = (Cit−Cit−1)− (C
∗
it−Cit−1).
While it is tempting to think about using changes in excess cash to replace the total
change in cash, the level of excess cash provides a natural decomposition of cash
holdings. We therefore decompose change in cash into two parts. The first is the
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optimal change in cash measured as the difference between the current target and
lagged cash. The second is the excess change in cash measured as the level of excess
cash. This provides us separate estimates of the relationship between governance,
leverage, and the value of cash depending on whether the firm has raised “too much”
cash or “not enough” cash.48
In order to make the excess cash predictions comparable to the change in cash
in our return regression, we modify the model of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999) so that dependent variable is scaled by market values of equity
instead of book asset values. This makes the predicted cash and excess cash compa-
rable to the change in cash used in the return regressions. Specifically, our regression
to predict excess cash is
ln
(
Cit
Mit−1
)
= α0 + α1 lnMit−1 + α2 lnNAit + α3
FCFit
NAit
+ α4
NWCit
NAit
+α5σindustry + α6
RDit
NAit
+ α7
MVit
NAit
+ uit. (3.5)
The regression follows that in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) closely. Because
the original specification is in natural logs, we add the log book value of non-cash
assets to both sides and subtract the log market value of equity from both sides.
As in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), we use firm and year fixed effects in the
regression.49
Given our predicted value of cash, we estimate the following regression:
ARit = βit
(
Cit
Mit−1
−
Ĉit
Mit−1
)
+ β ′it
(
Ĉit
Mit−1
−
Cit−1
Mit−1
)
+ ZitB+ εit (3.6)
48We have also fit the model ignoring changes in the target. The results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar.
49Results for our optimal cash estimation are omitted for space concerns, but are available upon
request. We have also fit the model replacing the market-to-book asset ratio with trailing 3-year
average sales growth. The predicted values of cash from the two models share a correlation of 0.966.
Not surprisingly, therefore, results are very similar using either model.
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βit = v +
∑
j
vG|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + vLLit−1 +
∑
j
vGL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1 (3.7)
β ′it = v
′ +
∑
j
v′G|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + v
′
LLit−1 +
∑
j
v′GL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1, (3.8)
where Ĉit
Mit−1
is the predicted optimal cash using equation 3.5.
We present results in Table 3.4. From Panel A, the BCF measures work in
excess cash much the same as they did in total changes in cash from Table 3.3. The
value of governance in an unlevered firm increases slightly from $1.38 to $1.49 for
contemporaneous BCF and from $1.13 to $1.34 for initial BCF . The ownership
measures also yield similar results. Moving from the bottom quintile of pension
holdings to the fourth quintile increases the value of each dollar of excess cash by $0.63
as opposed to the $0.59 in total changes in cash. Moving from the bottom quintile
of institutional holdings increases the value of each dollar of cash held by $0.75
instead of $0.65. We also see similar evidence of the conflict between shareholders
and creditors, as leverage reduces the net benefits of governance at approximately
the same rates as reported in Table 3.3.
Panel B provides more surprise. When making optimal adjustments in cash,
the net benefit of strong governance is zero according to the BCF measures. The
pension and total institutional ownership suggest a small, though still statistically
significant, net benefit of strong governance in optimal changes in cash. Since we must
estimate the optimal level of cash, it is not surprising that the model cannot split cash
changes into truly optimal and truly sub-optimal changes. However, the fact that the
coefficients drop so far relative to the excess changes in cash reported in Panel A is
comforting. The value of increasing to the fourth quintile of pension holdings drops
by half, as does the value of increasing to the top quintile of institutional holdings.
Thus, it appears that shareholder-manager and shareholder-creditor conflicts both
exist mainly in unusual cash decisions.
We plot cumulative distributions of the net benefits of governance in Figure 3.3.
We do not plot the blockholder, which as before shows no value of governance or
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Table 3.4
Value of Optimal and Excess Cash
We augment the main specification to the following regression for groups of firms based on one of five measures of governance:
ARit = βit
(
Cit
Mit−1
−
Ĉit
Mit−1
)
+ β
′
it
(
Ĉit
Mit−1
−
Cit−1
Mit−1
)
+ ZitB + εit
βit = v +
∑
j
vG|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + vLLit−1 +
∑
j
vGL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1
β
′
it = v
′
+
∑
j
v
′
G|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + v
′
LLit−1 +
∑
j
v
′
GL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1
where
Ĉit
Mit−1
is the predicted optimal cash using equation 3.5. Please see Table 3.1 for variable definitions.
BCF BCF0 Pension Block Institutions
vG—G=j vGL—G=j vG—G=j vGL—G=j vG—G=j vGL—G=j vG—G=j vGL—G=j vG—G=j vGL—G=j
Panel A: Value of Excess Cash Changes
G=2 0.2404 -0.7685 0.8768 -1.3380 0.1952 0.2008 0.0449 0.2689 -0.1617 0.4436
[0.697] [0.514] [0.250] [0.404] [0.218] [0.670] [0.836] [0.683] [0.332] [0.347]
G=3 0.5744 -1.4851 0.8763 -2.0035 0.5396 -0.8339 -0.0007 0.2936 0.1431 -0.2461
[0.307] [0.149] [0.218] [0.162] [0.002] [0.066] [0.997] [0.555] [0.422] [0.648]
G=4 0.8638 -1.8944 0.7743 -0.7815 0.6331 -1.0750 0.0855 -0.0945 0.2467 -0.1218
[0.127] [0.078] [0.231] [0.561] [0.002] [0.041] [0.626] [0.839] [0.214] [0.826]
G=5 0.8868 -1.6456 0.7892 1.8784 0.5571 -1.3173 0.0838 -0.2586 0.7482 -1.2062
[0.144] [0.135] [0.238] [0.158] [0.004] [0.013] [0.625] [0.582] [0.000] [0.035]
G=6 1.4933 -2.4274 1.3413 -1.5355 - - - - - -
[0.020] [0.068] [0.056] [0.296] - - - - - -
Panel B: Value of Optimal Cash Changes
G=2 -0.4665 0.5747 -0.2509 0.5265 -0.0064 0.4989 0.0223 0.6170 -0.1716 0.4923
[0.515] [0.721] [0.759] [0.774] [0.973] [0.316] [0.924] [0.356] [0.331] [0.295]
G=3 -0.1044 0.5041 -0.4721 0.4150 0.3789 -0.4363 0.0167 0.2609 -0.0924 0.1231
[0.878] [0.733] [0.551] [0.813] [0.030] [0.381] [0.926] [0.622] [0.601] [0.810]
G=4 -0.1096 0.4555 0.0568 0.4641 0.3712 -0.6117 0.0356 -0.1515 -0.1082 0.1252
[0.871] [0.754] [0.941] [0.789] [0.050] [0.226] [0.839] [0.747] [0.603] [0.832]
G=5 -0.2934 1.4095 0.0614 0.1925 0.2542 -0.8333 0.0406 -0.3885 0.3793 -1.0051
[0.675] [0.352] [0.935] [0.908] [0.191] [0.152] [0.823] [0.441] [0.073] [0.078]
G=6 0.4196 0.4244 0.2537 -0.5761 - - - - - -
[0.566] [0.782] [0.748] [0.757] - - - - - -
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Fig. 3.3. Excess and Optimal Changes in Cash.
The x-axis shows different net benefits of governance, while the y-axis represents the
cumulative percent of weakly governed at or below that net benefit. For the BCF
measure, decreases indicate stronger governance, while for the ownership measures,
increases generally indicate stronger governance.
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relationship between governance and leverage, or the initial BCF measure, which
looks very similar to the contemporaneous BCF measure. The figures tell an in-
teresting story. As discussed previously, the benefits in excess cash mirror those of
the total change in cash. Thus, the benefits of governance in controlling uses of
cash reflect uses of excess cash. More importantly, firms are not losing anything in
optimal changes in cash. For all three measures, most firms have a small gain from
governance even in optimal cash. This implies that firms gain significantly from
governance in controlling excess cash. Moveover, firms do not lose significantly from
governance in terms of optimal cash policy. On net, therefore, the benefits of strong
governance appear positive.
3.4 Economic Significance of Cash Holdings
Of course, if the value of $1 cash is twice as big under strong governance as
weak, but firms hold only a few dollars cash, the effects we’ve identified are trivial.
For each weakly governed firm year, we estimate the net benefits of governance as
before. We then multiply that estimated benefit by the ratio of cash to market
equity. This transforms the gains from per dollar of cash held to a percent of market
equity. We report summary statistics in Table 3.5. Our average gains to shareholders
are of similar magnitude to Nikolov and Whited (2010), who build and estimate a
structural model that includes agency conflicts between shareholders and managers.
While our estimation technique does not overlap with theirs, nor do they work with
costs of conflicts between shareholders and creditors, we view their average costs as an
important benchmark for the average value of governance in controlling shareholder-
manager conflicts (Nikolov and Whited, 2010, Table 5). Nikolov and Whited (2010)
report losses of 5.1% on average, whereas our estimated losses are 7.2% for a weak
76
BCF firm, 7.7% using initialBCF , and 7.2% for institutions.50 We find it comforting
that two completely different approaches provide such similar estimates.51
Also as before, the twenty-fifth percentile of our net benefit measure is posi-
tive. This implies that only at the top twenty-fifth percentile of leverage ratios sees
the value of cash in strong governance firms below that in weak governance firms.
The median gains, which are smaller than the mean gain because cash holdings are
skewed, also tend to suggest 3% to 4% increases in shareholder value associated with
strong governance. For the bottom twenty-fifth percentile of leverage ratios, the dif-
ference in values of cash holdings between strong and weak governance firms is on
the order of 10% of equity value. The gains to strong governance are large. The
losses associated with leverage seem very small. This makes it hard to believe that
shareholders optimally choose weak governance to protect themselves against costly
shareholder-creditor conflicts.
One intriguing alternative is that firms choose weak governance so that they
can adjust leverage easily. We cannot rule out this alternative entirely, but we can
provide some evidence against it. If firms correctly judge their leverage needs on
50The fact that these numbers mesh so well is all the more surprising given that Nikolov and Whited
(2010) do not attempt to match the value of cash holdings directly. The value of cash holdings
is implied after matching other moments of financing and investment policies. Moreover, in their
model, ownership and bonuses are the mechanisms built in to align shareholders and managers.
As long as the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) index and 13-F institutional holdings measures
either (1) act as substitutes for compensation or (2) help determine compensation policies, the
estimates are roughly comparable.
51Also, Nikolov and Whited (2010) report gains to governance where firms are grouped by the BCF ,
blockholder, and total institutional holdings measures. Our estimates are not directly comparable
to those estimates because they represent cross effects of managerial compensation with other gov-
ernance measures. For example, the difference between the high institutional ownership and low
institutional ownership losses in Nikolov and Whited (2010) are approximately 13%. However,
this implies that strong institutional ownership decreases the effectiveness of managerial compen-
sation by 13%, not that the gain to institutional holdings is 13%. A more correct comparison is
the following: For firms with weak institutional ownership, Nikolov and Whited (2010) estimate
that improving incentive alignment through compensation increases shareholder value by 4.99%.
For firms with weak institutional ownership, we estimate that increasing institutional ownership
increases shareholder value by 7.2%.
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Table 3.5
Weighted Net Shareholder Gains from Improved Governance.
This table provides estimates of the net benefits of governance in controlling cash as a percent
of market value of equity. We use the estimates from Table 3.3 to calculate the net benefit of
governance for all firms in the weakest governance group. We then multiply those benefits by the
ratio of cash held to market value of equity to estimate wealth losses to shareholders.
Mean Std Dev 25th Pct Med 75th Pct
BCF G = 2 -0.014 0.055 -0.011 -0.002 0.001
G = 3 0.016 0.062 0.001 0.006 0.026
G = 4 0.024 0.086 0.001 0.010 0.037
G = 5 0.025 0.066 0.002 0.010 0.033
G = 6 0.072 0.117 0.012 0.038 0.087
BCF0 G = 2 0.039 0.057 0.006 0.020 0.048
G = 3 0.019 0.054 0.001 0.007 0.024
G = 4 0.060 0.086 0.010 0.030 0.073
G = 5 0.035 0.078 0.003 0.013 0.043
G = 6 0.077 0.115 0.012 0.039 0.096
Pension G = 2 0.024 0.040 0.004 0.011 0.027
G = 3 0.074 0.137 0.004 0.026 0.092
G = 4 0.077 0.147 0.004 0.026 0.096
G = 5 0.035 0.110 -0.001 0.010 0.053
Block G = 2 0.030 0.044 0.005 0.015 0.037
G = 3 0.026 0.040 0.004 0.013 0.032
G = 4 0.007 0.027 0.000 0.003 0.012
G = 5 0.001 0.024 -0.001 0.001 0.006
Institutions G = 2 -0.019 0.035 -0.024 -0.007 -0.001
G = 3 0.020 0.041 0.001 0.007 0.027
G = 4 0.030 0.059 0.002 0.011 0.039
G = 5 0.072 0.153 0.003 0.026 0.097
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average, the net benefit of strong governance in their highest leverage year should
be negative, offsetting any positive net benefit of strong governance in their lowest
leverage year. We calculate the net benefit of governance at each firm’s minimum
and maximum leverage ratios, then add the two net benefit measures together. If
firms gain from governance in their lowest leverage years but lose from governance
in their highest leverage years, we expect a sum at or below zero.
For the BCF , BCF0, and total institutional ownership measures, we consider the
difference between the value of cash in the top and bottom governance groups. For
the pension holdings measure, we consider the difference between the second-highest
quintile and the lowest quintile of pension holdings. We add the net benefit of strong
governance at the firm’s minimum leverage ratio to the net benefit at the firm’s
maximum leverage ratio. We plot histograms for the four measures and provide
results in Figure 3.4. The black bars show the (not cumulative) histogram, while the
red bars show the cumulative distribution. Based on the Figure, the major clustering
occurs at a minimum of $1.00 to $1.25 (Pension) and a maximum of $1.75 to $2.00
(BCF). This means that at the firm level, most firms gain much more from strong
governance in their lowest leverage year than they lose from governance in their
highest leverage year. The Figure shows no evidence of symmetry around $0.00,
either. At most, 15% of firms lose more from strong governance in their highest
leverage years than the gain from governance in their lowest leverage years. Either
firms drastically underestimated the amount of leverage they needed over the sample
period, or dynamic concerns in leverage do not drive these firms weak governance
choices.
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Fig. 3.4. Minimum and Maximum Leverage Ratios.
We use estimates from Table 3.3 to calculate the net benefit of governance at each
firms’ minimum and maximum leverage ratios. We add these values together for
firms in the weakest governance group. This figure shows the empirical distribution
of that sum (black bars) and cumulative distribution of the sum (red bars).
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3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Non-linear Effects of Leverage
If the effects of leverage on the net benefits of governance are non-linear, do our
interpretations change? In Table 3.6, we provide estimates using power transfor-
mations of our leverage ratio. We replace the variable Lit−1 in Equation 3.1 with
Lγt−1 for different values of γ. Because the blockholder measure shows no significant
effects, we exclude it here. Two important results emerge. First, we see that the
point estimates for the benefits of governance are not changed much by nonlinear
specifications for the BCF measure. For the ownership measures, there is a bit more
variation. Second, note that the R2 measures suggest that a linear (or near-linear)
specification in leverage fits best. The coefficients vGL are harder to interpret in the
non-linear specifications. Though their magnitude changes markedly across different
specifications, so does the number that they multiply. To ease interpretation, we
once again provide graphical results for the distribution of losses. The curves line up
closely with our original estimates, confirming that the vast majority of firms gain
from strong governance even when the relationship between leverage and the benefit
of strong governance is not assumed linear.
3.5.2 Endogeneity
A second important question is whether endogeneity can overturn our conclusions.
We must be careful here in what we view as possible endogeneity problems. Our
tests are not intended to uncover jointly optimal choices of governance, leverage, and
cash. Instead, we are asking whether strong governance helps or hurts shareholders
at observed leverage ratios. Though endogeneity could change the interpretation of
our estimates, we can still shed some light on this question even if firms set cash
holdings and leverage anticipating returns.
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Table 3.6
Nonlinear Leverage Specifications.
We replace Lt−1 in Equation 3.1 with L
γ
t−1 for γ = {0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, 20}. We provide the difference between strong and weak governance
firms based on the governance grouping with the highest value of cash from Table 3.3. p-values clustered by firm appear in brackets. We also
report partial R2, which gives the R2 of the regressions net of firm fixed-effects.
BCF BCF0 Pension Institutions
γ vG|G=6 vGL|G=6 R
2 vG|G=6 vGL|G=6 R
2 vG|G=6 vGL|G=6 R
2 vG|G=6 vGL|G=6 R
2
0.5 1.3803 -0.6757 0.1597 1.2360 -0.5349 0.1657 0.7447 -0.5054 0.1821 0.8110 -0.6169 0.1853
[0.129] [0.327] [0.213] [0.472] [0.001] [0.017] [0.001] [0.006]
0.75 1.4102 -1.3372 0.1624 1.1710 -0.9280 0.1682 0.6594 -0.8105 0.1832 0.7197 -1.0463 0.1865
[0.043] [0.147] [0.139] [0.375] [0.001] [0.019] [0.000] [0.003]
1 1.3766 -2.0779 0.1636 1.1333 -1.4157 0.1692 0.5923 -1.1246 0.1831 0.6450 -1.5446 0.1865
[0.020] [0.080] [0.092] [0.298] [0.001] [0.025] [0.001] [0.003]
1.5 1.2858 -3.7731 0.1636 1.0768 -2.6267 0.1687 0.4978 -1.7457 0.1819 0.5400 -2.7771 0.1854
[0.009] [0.038] [0.046] [0.197] [0.003] [0.052] [0.001] [0.002]
2 1.2109 -5.7920 0.1623 1.0321 -4.1373 0.1671 0.4381 -2.3326 0.1804 0.4737 -4.3758 0.1838
[0.007] [0.027] [0.029] [0.136] [0.005] [0.102] [0.003] [0.002]
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To overturn our conclusions about the small economic magnitudes of shareholder-
creditor conflicts in choosing governance, alternative stories must pass several hur-
dles. The most important hurdle is that any endogeneity must create value for
shareholders, destroy value for creditors, and vary with governance. If, for example,
managers respond to unexpected returns by hoarding cash, and this effect differs
by governance, it might explain why our estimates differ. However, this type of
story will not change our conclusions for two reasons. First, if cash does not in-
crease shareholder value, then shareholder interests cannot differ from those of cred-
itors. If shareholder interests do not differ from those of creditors, then there is no
shareholder-creditor conflict to drive governance choices. Second, if governance has
a causal impact, then our results still imply that some behavior differs between man-
agers facing strong governance and managers facing weak governance. That behavior
converges as leverage increases, but only for extremely high leverage ratios. If strong
governance aligns managers with shareholders and weak governance aligns managers
with creditorsVan assumption supported by extant researchVthis still means that
strong governance alters managerial behavior for the vast majority of firms.
The prior arguments require a causal impact of governance. If governance im-
proves when the value of cash is highest, we could still see what appears to be a
net benefit of governance where there is none. Therefore, endogenous governance
choices might reverse our conclusions. Because the initial BCF measure is set be-
fore the valuation of cash in a given year, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use that
variable to help establish causality. According to the prior results, the exogenous
part of that measure supports the hypothesis that strong governance creates value
for shareholders, but does not strongly support the hypothesis that leverage reduces
the net benefits of governance. This is prima facie evidence against shareholder-
creditor conflicts as an important cost of strong governance because it implies that
shareholders prefer strong governance regardless of leverage.
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The institutional ownership measures are not as persistent, and as such, initial
holdings do not provide much information about current holdings (as Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith, 2007 also note). We turn to an IV estimator to establish the causality
of institutional ownership measures. We use the natural log of lagged shares out-
standing as an instrument. This instrument satisfies two important criteria. First,
shares outstanding changes ownership structure. For example, for a given market
capitalization, greater shares outstanding reduces price and therefore encourages in-
dividual ownership. Second, the natural log of lagged shares outstanding should
not convey any additional information to the market concerning returns. Several
arguments support this claim. First, we are using levels of shares outstanding, not
differences. Therefore, the fact that financing events predict low returns is mitigated
here.52 Second, we include additional controls for the natural log of lagged market
cap and lagged abnormal returns. This means we rely on lagged shares outstanding’s
explanatory power above and beyond available return and size information to identify
plausibly exogenous changes in institutional ownership. Unless shares outstanding
changes the composition of ownership, it is hard to see why splitting the same firm
into more or fewer pieces could affect returns.
Unfortunately, we do not have enough instrumental variables to identify each gov-
ernance dummy variables used in Table 3.3. However, we can use the quintile number
as a governance variable as in Table 3.2. Rather than estimating the marginal impact
of each different governance level, these models once again provide the average treat-
ment effect of increasing ownership from one quintile to the next for the ownership
measures.
We report results in Table 3.7. Because blockholdings do not show results in
the prior tests, we again exclude that measure here. Both the effect of governance
52See Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) and McLean, Pontiff, and Watanabe (2009) for U.S. and inter-
national evidence that share issuance and repurchases predict returns.
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Table 3.7
Two-stage Least-squares Evidence.
We fit equation 3.2 using two-stage least-squares:
ARit = βit
∆Cit
Mit−1
+ ZitB+ εit
βit = v + vGGit + vLLit−1 + vGLGitLit−1
Because each quintile dummy variables requires an additional instrument, we use
the quintile number of institutional ownership as a continuous variable. We use the
natural log of lagged shares outstanding as an instrument for institutional ownership
quintile number. The results are therefore average effects of improving one gover-
nance quintile, comparable to those in Table 3.2. We also include the natural log
of lagged market cap and the lagged abnormal return as additional controls for size
effects. p-values clustered by firm appear in brackets.
Pension Quintile Institutions Quintile
vG 0.2989 0.4040
[0.0003] [0.0002]
vGL -0.4858 -0.6561
[0.0258] [0.0159]
v 1.6092 1.3658
[0.0000] [0.0000]
vL -0.6579 -0.3290
[0.0371] [0.4425]
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Fig. 3.5. Two-stage Least-squares.
For each firm year in the weakest governance group, we calculate the net benefit of
increasing governance from a lower group to a higher group as vG + vGL × Lit−1.
Two-stage least-squares estimates of vG and vGL appear in Table 3.7. The x-axis
shows different net benefits of governance, while the y-axis represents the cumulative
percent of weakly governed at or below that net benefit.
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and the interaction between governance and leverage increase in magnitude. For the
pension measure, the benefit of stronger governance in an unlevered firm increases
from $0.15 to $0.30. The rate at which leverage reduces the value of governance moves
from $0.35 to $0.49. We see similar increases in the institutional holdings measure.
This suggests that when institutional investors select firms, they select those firms
where the value of cash is relatively low. By focusing on exogenous institutional
ownership, we get a better idea about the value they create. We plot the values
of governance that these estimates imply in Figure 3.5. Here the results are even
more striking. More than 85% of weakly governed firms would increase the value of
their cash holdings by increasing the exogenous portion of pension and institutional
holdings into the next highest group. Of low pension holdings firms, half would gain
$0.20 or more per dollar of cash held by increasing pension presence, and 65% of
low total institutional ownership firms could gain more $0.25 or more per dollar by
increasing institutional ownership. These amounts are large. Whatever costs keep
shareholders from improving governance must be at least that big. However, the
major costs of governance appear unrelated to leverage based on our results. Thus,
shareholder-creditor conflicts do not appear major contributors to firms’ choice of
weak governance.
3.5.3 Non-cash Assets
The third important question is whether the benefits of governance in increasing
cash are offset by costs in other policies. While we could never refute this argument
fully, we can consider the value of cash, which represents future actions, against
other assets, which represent assets currently in place. We re-estimate our models
with additional parameters that allow the value of non-cash assets to depend on
governance and leverage. We present estimates of the effects of governance and
leverage on cash and non-cash assets in Table 3.8. The ownership measures and the
initial BCF measure are not affected to any notable degree by the inclusion of values
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of non-cash assets. The value of large institutional ownership falls by approximately
$0.04 per dollar held, for example. The contemporaneous BCF measure shows a
much larger value of strong governance when we account for other assets separately.
In fact, the point estimate increases by more than $0.30 per dollar of cash held.
The interaction between leverage and governance also becomes much stronger. From
Panel B, the ownership and initial BCF measures also show no effects on the value
of non-cash assets. There is a nearly significant coefficient on the interaction between
leverage and total institutional holdings. We treat this as significant, which biases us
toward finding shareholder-creditor conflicts. However, for the other measures, we
fail to find even nearly significant governance or governance and leverage interaction
effects. The BCF measure, on the other hand, shows a relationship with the value
of cash holdings as well as a strong governance and leverage interaction.
To evaluate the magnitudes of the non-cash asset effects for the BCF and total
institutional holdings measures, we once again plot the distribution of net values
of governance for weak governance firms. We face an interpretation issue however.
Non-cash assets make up much more of a firm’s assets than cash does. Therefore,
we multiply our cash estimates from Panel A by the ratio of cash to market value
of equity, we multiply our non-cash assets from Panel B by the ratio of non-cash
assets to the market value of equity, and sum the resulting gains.53 We plot the
distributions in Figure 3.6.
53For non-cash assets, especially the institutional holdings measure, we face an important choice. If
we treat both the governance term and the governance and leverage interaction term as significant
in non-cash assets, we will find tremendous costs of governance for all firms because both point
estimates are negative. Since non-cash assets are a large part of firms, this automatically implies the
value of governance is negative for most firms. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, the negative
coefficient for governance is small economically and has a very high p-value. Second, by starting
with a negative value of governance, we give credit to shareholder-creditor conflicts as explaining
weak governance firms even though the results literally imply that the value of governance is simply
low for all firms regardless of leverage. We therefore only use the interaction between leverage and
governance to estimate the net benefit of governance in non-cash assets for our total institutional
holdings measure.
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Table 3.8
Leverage and Governance Effects on the Value of Non-cash Assets.
We augment equation 3.1 as the following regression for groups of firms based on one of five measures of governance:
ARit = βit
∆Cit
Mit−1
+ Θit
∆NAit
Mit−1
+ ZitB+ εit
βit = v +
∑
j
vG|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + vLLit−1 +
∑
j
vGL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1
Θit = θ +
∑
j
θG|G=jI[Git ∈ j] + θLLit−1 +
∑
j
θGL|G=jI[Git ∈ j]Lit−1.
Panel A: Value of Cash
BCF BCF0 Pension Block Institutions
vG|G=j vGL|G=j vG|G=j vGL|G=j vG|G=j vGL|G=j vG|G=j vGL|G=j vG|G=j vGL|G=j
G=2 0.4395 -2.0168 0.5348 -0.5928 0.0404 0.3213 0.2357 -0.2829 -0.1190 0.0912
[0.477] [0.107] [0.500] [0.721] [0.798] [0.471] [0.278] [0.664] [0.430] [0.830]
G=3 0.9591 -2.4410 0.5586 -1.1828 0.5583 -1.1049 0.1856 -0.2165 0.1404 -0.4094
[0.092] [0.029] [0.457] [0.430] [0.001] [0.014] [0.272] [0.659] [0.393] [0.407]
G=4 1.1491 -2.8046 0.7576 -0.5110 0.5390 -0.9942 0.1303 -0.6574 0.2669 -0.8133
[0.045] [0.014] [0.285] [0.730] [0.004] [0.053] [0.383] [0.011] [0.165] [0.128]
G=5 1.0001 -2.3857 0.8110 -1.4396 0.4012 -1.3976 0.0177 -0.3893 0.6041 -1.6514
[0.096] [0.036] [0.255] [0.308] [0.019] [0.006] [0.911] [0.376] [0.002] [0.001]
G=6 1.7006 -3.2235 1.2016 -1.6787 - - - - - -
[0.007] [0.013] [0.110] [0.281] - - - - - -
Panel B: Value of Non-cash Assets
BCF BCF0 Pension Block Institutions
ΘG|G=j ΘGL|G=j ΘG|G=j ΘGL|G=j ΘG|G=j ΘGL|G=j ΘG|G=j ΘGL|G=j ΘG|G=j ΘGL|G=j
G=2 0.0492 -0.6168 -0.1580 0.3635 -0.1383 0.3844 0.0896 -0.2744 0.0604 -0.0611
[0.736] [0.083] [0.440] [0.488] [0.332] [0.106] [0.338] [0.171] [0.374] [0.654]
G=3 0.2808 -0.8425 -0.0601 0.2508 0.0622 -0.1321 -0.0177 0.0183 -0.0853 0.0704
[0.056] [0.013] [0.766] [0.622] [0.383] [0.373] [0.804] [0.903] [0.500] [0.750]
G=4 0.2314 -0.7614 -0.0219 0.1034 -0.0009 -0.0977 -0.0436 -0.0200 0.0732 -0.2676
[0.184] [0.061] [0.909] [0.837] [0.990] [0.543] [0.483] [0.879] [0.360] [0.108]
G=5 0.1947 -0.6277 0.0847 0.1737 -0.0651 0.0605 -0.0760 -0.0495 -0.0185 -0.3409
[0.289] [0.103] [0.733] [0.758] [0.467] [0.747] [0.564] [0.831] [0.839] [0.102]
G=6 0.3529 -1.0355 0.1070 -0.1510 - - - - - -
[0.043] [0.009] [0.617] [0.776] - - - - - -
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Fig. 3.6. Cash and Non-cash Assets.
We calculate the net benefit of improving governance on cash values from the weakest
group to group j as
(
vG|G=j + vGL|G=j × Lit−1
)
× Cit
Mit
for each weakly governed firm
year. Estimates of vG|G=j and vGL|G=j appear in Panel A of Table 3.8. We calculate
the net benefit of improving governance on values of other assets from the weakest
group to group j as
(
ΘG|G=j +ΘGL|G=j × Lit−1
)
×NAit
Mit
for each weakly governed firm
year. Estimates of ΘG|G=j and ΘGL|G=j appear in Panel B of Table 3.8. For each
firm year, we then sum these values to calculate the overall net benefit of improved
governance on cash and non-cash assets. The x-axis shows different net benefits of
governance, while the y-axis represents the cumulative percent of weakly governed
at or below that net benefit. We plot the overall benefit of moving from five or
six to zero entrenching provisions for the BCF measure, as that measure shows
statistically significant governance and leverage effects in Panel B of Table 3.8. We
also plot the overall benefit of moving from the smallest institutional holding quintile
to the largest institutional holding quintile as that measure shows a nearly significant
leverage and governance interaction in Table 3.8.
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The results for the BCF model are as before, although the scaling has undergone
an important change here. As in Table 3.5, all costs and benefits are expressed as
a percent of equity values instead of per dollar of cash held. Approximately 75% of
weak governance firms show a positive difference between the equity value in strong
and weak governance firms. Moreover, for the median leverage ratio of weak BCF
firms, the difference in value exceeds 15%. These are tremendous gains. However,
we also see that governance is extremely costly for some firms. Approximately 25%
of weak governance firm leverage ratios imply negative net benefits of strong gover-
nance. Almost 20% of leverage ratios suggests losses from strong governance greater
than 5% of equity value. This is consistent with extreme costs of shareholder-creditor
conflicts for those firms and suggests that for those firms, shareholder-creditor con-
flicts provide a plausible explanation for their choice to remain weakly governed. For
the 75% of firms with gains to governance, however, shareholder-creditor conflicts
are too small to explain why they’ve chosen weak governance.
The institutional holdings results are a bit weaker. However, more than 55%
of weak governance firms could increase their market value of equity by improving
governance. Moreover, approximately 25% of weak institutional holdings firms could
increase their equity value by 5% or more by improving governance. It is important
to remember that we calculate these gains assuming that leverage hurts the value
of governance in other assets even though (1) governance does not show any impact
alone on the value of other assets and (2) the coefficient is not statistically significant
at traditional levels. We view this result as an overstatement of the effects of leverage
and yet, even here, leverage ratios are typically too low to explain weak governance
choices in more than half of weak governance firm years.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
We find that leverage reduces the net value of governance in controlling uses of
cash. Even if one ascribes the entire reduction to conflicts between shareholders
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and creditor, however, leverage ratios are too small to explain why two-thirds of
weakly governed firms maintain weak governance. Our conclusion is not driven by
endogenous changes in governance or nonlinearity, and it is suboptimal cash holdings
rather than optimal cash holdings that generate our main results.
Because many of the choices we make in this study bias in favor of finding strong
conflicts between shareholders and creditors, we view our results as a reasonable
upper bound for the number of firms that can benefit from weak governance. While
our estimates suggest some firms gain very little or even lose value in cash holdings
from switching to strong governance, these firms represent a small minority. The
estimates suggest that the losses from weak governance decreases equity values by
2% to 3%, with averages closer to 7%.
An alternative explanation for our results is that leverage acts as a substitute
mechanism for controlling free cash flow. As leverage increases, governance becomes
relatively less effective as there are fewer instances of managerial malfeasance to
correct. Our tests cannot distinguish between this hypothesis and the shareholder-
creditor hypothesis. However, this alternative force should make finding evidence for
shareholder-creditor conflicts even easier. Even with alternatives, strong governance
appears beneficial for all but the most highly levered firms. We leave further analysis
of how the substitution effect and conflict effect interact to future research.
Although our focus was on whether the conflicts between shareholders and cred-
itors could explain governance choices, our results have some implications for the
under-leverage debate, as well. Graham (2000) shows that firms do not exhaust the
tax benefits of debt leading to the debate on whether firms are under-levered. Par-
rino and Weisbach (1999) argue via simulation that the costs of conflicts between
shareholders and creditors are too small to explain why firms choose such low lever-
age. Although our focus is on governance choices, rather than leverage choices, we
find strong support that the costs of shareholder-creditor conflicts at observed lever-
age ratios seems too small relative to the governance choice, as well. On the other
92
hand, Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2003) show that the value of the firm
is quite flat with respect to tradeoffs between tax shields and distress costs, which
implies that even a small conflict effect could help explain variation in leverage ra-
tios. This argument suggests strong governance firms should choose lower leverage,
as shown by John and Litov (2009). Sorting out the leverage effects of tax shields,
distress costs, and apparently small costs of shareholder-creditor conflicts provides
an interesting challenge for future work.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we address two research questions. First, we study the stigma
of the adverse effect of intentional financial misreporting on bank loan pricing and
the mitigation of such effect associated with significant firm actions. Second, we
ask whether shareholder-creditor conflicts generate costs that are large enough to
prevent improvements in governance.
From the findings presented in the first essay, “Why Won’t You Forgive Me?
Evidence of a Financial Misreporting Stigma in Bank Loan Pricing,” we find con-
sistency with the view that misreporting creates a long-lasting and costly stigma
that causes banks to question the credibility of the firms’ future reported financial
information, and perhaps more generally, the veracity of firms. Banks therefore face
greater screening and monitoring costs and charge a significant misreporting pre-
mium in loan spreads. Prompt replacement of certain parties potentially related to
the misreporting shortens the duration of the stigma, but a majority of firms do not
make such prompt replacements and pay misreporting premiums for at least four
to five years following their restatements. The long-lasting stigma evident in loan
spreads suggests that banks place great importance on the truthfulness of informa-
tion provided by firms.
From the second essay, “Can Shareholder-creditor Conflicts Explain Weak Gov-
ernance? Evidence from the Value of Cash Holdings,” consistent with shareholder-
creditor conflicts, we find that leverage reduces the net value of governance in con-
trolling uses of cash. However, even if one ascribes the entire reduction to conflicts
between shareholders and creditor, leverage ratios are still too small to explain why
two-thirds of weakly governed firms maintain weak governance. Given our results,
we assert that there must be some cost that prevents shareholders from improving
governance, but that cost is unrelated to leverage. Therefore, the widely proposed
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potential explanation–shareholder-creditor conflicts–cannot explain why sharehold-
ers allow weak governance to persist.
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